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Acquiring property is a central part of the modern American vision
of the good life. The assumption that accruing more land or chattels
will make us better off is so central to the contemporary preoccupa-
tion with acquisition that it typically goes without saying. Yet an
increasing body of evidence from psychologists and economists who
study hedonics—the science of happiness—yields the surprising con-
clusion that getting and having property does not actually increase
our subjective well-being. In fact, it might even decrease it. While
scholars have integrated the insights of hedonics into other areas of
law, no scholarship has yet done so with respect to property.
This Article maps this novel territory in three steps. In Part I, it
summarizes recent findings on the highly conflicted effect of the
acquisition of both land and chattels on subjective well-being. In
Part II, it explores the implications of these findings for four leading
normative theories of property law, showing that in different ways
the evidence produced by happiness studies undermines the core em-
pirical propositions on which these theories rest. Part II also explores
the potential of subjective well-being as a framework for assessing the
optimal regulation of ownership. Finally, Part III investigates how
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looking at property through the lens of happiness can help us see this
ancient body of law in a new light. Evidence from happiness studies
casts doubt on some policies (state promotion of homeownership),
while suggesting the appeal of others (tax incentives and disincen-
tives designed to nudge acquisition in the direction of greater
subjective well-being). Happiness analysis also suggests promising
new insights about related aspects of property, including law’s
attempts to prevent dispossession, the proper allocation of public
versus private land, and the nascent sharing economy. This Article
concludes by showing why these findings actually tell an optimistic,
if nonobvious, story about the nature and future of property.
2017] BUYING HAPPINESS 1853
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INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY AS HAPPINESS
The Declaration of Independence begins with the stirring asser-
tion that among the “unalienable Rights” with which we are all
“endowed by [our] Creator” are “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.”1 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
similarly guarantees that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”2 These two great
documents concur on the importance of life and liberty, but while
the Declaration of Independence completes the triad with the
freedom to pursue “happiness,” the Due Process Clause instead
privileges “property.”
In the present-day United States, though, one might wonder
whether there is any daylight between these two formulations.
Modern American consumer culture tends to equate the acquisition
of real and personal property with happiness itself.3 As Bo Derek
famously quipped, “Whoever said money can’t buy happiness simply
didn’t know where to go shopping.”4 Our vision of the good life is
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The overlap is not a coincidence. These two phrases share a
common ancestor: John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, in which he averred that society
existed for the purpose of protecting an individual’s “life, liberty, and estate.” See JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 163 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947)
(1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT]. Historians have inferred from
Thomas Jefferson’s emendation that he meant to downplay the state’s role in protecting
property, though Jefferson may also have gotten the phrase “the pursuit of happiness” from
Locke, who used it several times in his 1689 essay Concerning Human Understanding. See
1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 239, 244-45, 252 (15th ed.
1753). James Madison, by contrast, apparently had no such revisionist aspirations and
transposed Locke’s phrasing wholesale into the Fifth Amendment save for the slight
modernization of “estate” into the vernacular “property.” See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See Carol V. Hamilton, Why Did Jefferson Change “Property” to the “Pursuit of
Happiness”?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 27, 2008), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/
46460 [https://perma.cc/SN2P-YFPV] (“[S]adly, for many Americans, Jefferson might just as
well have left ‘property’ in place. To them the pursuit of happiness means no more than the
pursuit of wealth and status as embodied in a McMansion, a Lexus, and membership in a
country club.”).
4. See Brad Tuttle, The True Meaning of Shopping, TIME (Dec. 14, 2010), http://business.
time.com/2010/12/14/the-true-meaning-of-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/68PY-7NBA] (listing ten
“insightful quotes” on “the deeper meaning of shopping”). This sentiment launched a thousand
aphorisms, among them Albert Camus’s quip, “It’s a kind of spiritual snobbery that makes
people think they can be happy without money.” See BARBARA WELTMAN, J.K. LASSER’S GUIDE
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punctuated with getting things—from a teenager’s first car to a
wedding ring to a family home (which is equated ad nauseam with
the “American dream”5) to our final resting place.6 The state sup-
ports this push towards acquisition in a number of ways,7 most
evidently in its approach to residential housing. State rhetoric
equates housing with the American dream and promotes the pur-
chase of family homes with an edifice of incentives ranging from the
mortgage interest tax deduction to government-sponsored entities
like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which exist primarily to facilitate
mortgage origination.
In light of the constant cultural and legal push toward ownership,
it would seem that acquiring property makes owners better off. But
does it? A growing body of literature at the nexus of social psych-
ology and behavioral economics—“hedonics” for short—suggests
that, in at least one very important way, it may not. Work in this
field has produced a trove of data that complicates the dominant
story of American property triumphalism: acquiring things—in-
cluding and especially real property—does not appear to enhance
owners’ subjective sense of well-being, and under many circum-
stances may actually decrease it. These findings are driven to a
large extent by our tendency to hedonically adapt to our circum-
stances, so that even after purchasing a great new watch or a fancy
FOR TOUGH TIMES 202 (2009). Modern businesses have picked up on this theme. Consider
electronics retailer Best Buy’s trademarked slogan for its gift cards: “No fees. No expiration
dates. Just happiness.” Best Buy Gift Card, BEST BUY BUS., http://www.bestbuybusiness.
com/bbfb/en/US/adirect/bestbuy?cmd=BBFBStaticContent&id=content/gift-cards/giftcards.
html [https://perma.cc/23XX-CRAF]. There are also plenty of counter-aphorisms reflecting the
belief that wealth does not result in happiness. See infra Part I.B.2.
5. This language of equivalence is intentional. Americans are told that owning a home
is not only part of or related to the “American dream,” but is the “American dream.” For
example, when the maker of one documentary asked (former) homeowners why they bought
homes far larger than they needed with mortgages for which they did not qualify, they almost
uniformly replied that owning a home is part of the American dream. See Frontline: The Card
Game (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 2009).
6. In many U.S. jurisdictions, the purchase of a burial plot entails the same formalities
as acquisition of any other real property, such as a contract of sale and a deed showing title
ownership. See Cemetery Forms, USLEGAL, http://www.uslegalforms.com/cemetery-forms.htm
[https://perma.cc/3EH6-3U36].
7. Importantly, this Article focuses exclusively on property acquisition. The happiness
literature suggests a different and more complicated story about the corollary question
whether law should prevent the dispossession of property once owners possess it. I plan to
explore this issue in a future companion piece, Dispossession, Property, and Happiness.
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car, it soon becomes just a background fact in our life, and the mo-
mentary happiness over the acquisition of such things fades away
(and may even be replaced by regret at making a foolish purchase).
Getting property can also make us more materialistic (which is
strongly associated with unhappiness8) and less able to savor life’s
small pleasures.9 But the lesson of this new research is not that
property ownership is unequivocally harmful to owners’ subjective
well-being. Acquisition can increase happiness when it is thoughtful
and motivated by nonmaterialist goals. As Elizabeth Dunn and
Michael Norton, two leading scholars in the field, show, “If you
think money doesn’t buy happiness, then you’re just not spending
it right.”10
Surprisingly, while the insights of hedonics generally have been
explored in other legal scholarship, these findings remain largely
unexplored with respect to property law. This Article teases out two
major implications from the empirical evidence about the troubled
relationship between property and happiness. First, the proposition
that acquiring land and chattels often reduces our subjective well-
being complicates, and may even severely undermine, many of the
leading normative theories animating property law as well as the
substantive law of ownership itself. Scholars have justified the ex-
istence of legal protections for ownership on a variety of bases.
These justifications include the notion that property enhances social
and individual wealth, provides a bulwark against statist oppres-
sion (or, contrariwise, that it creates a richer sense of community
among neighbors), and supplies a critical outlet for self-expression
and an embodiment of essential personhood.11 But if hedonics
8. See Kirk Warren Brown et al., Materialism, Spending, and Affect: An Event-Sampling
Study of Marketplace Behavior and Its Affective Costs, 17 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 2277, 2278
(2015) (discussing the strong relationship between materialism and unhappiness).
9. See Russell W. Belk, Materialism: Trait Aspects of Living in the Material World, 12
J. CONSUMER RES. 265, 274 (1985); Martha C. White, Here’s Proof Buying More Stuff Actually
Makes You Miserable, TIME (Mar. 13, 2014), http://time.com/22257/heres-proof-buying-more-
stuff-actually-makes-you-miserable/ [https://perma.cc/6XRM-EPZK] (summarizing happiness
studies showing that purchasing consumer goods led to a materialistic mindset and lowered
subjective well-being).
10. See Dan Gilbert, Cover to ELIZABETH DUNN & MICHAEL NORTON, HAPPY MONEY: THE
SCIENCE OF HAPPIER SPENDING (2013) (offering five principles for spending “happy money”).
11. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 4 (3d ed. 2015) (viewing property as “an efficient method of allocating valuable
resources in order to maximize one particular facet of societal happiness: wealth, typically
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scholars are right that property ownership can reduce our subjective
well-being, constrain both our sense of freedom and our community
ties, and does not make up a necessary condition for self-realization,
then the empirical foundations on which each of these accounts are
based fall away. By contrast, happiness itself may provide the most
coherent framework for how to allocate and incentivize the acquisi-
tion of property in order to maximize individual and social welfare.
But at the very least, the fact that acquiring and owning land and
things may reduce our subjective well-being is an important input
into any consequentialist approach to regulating ownership.
Regardless of how exactly happiness cashes out theoretically, the
findings of the hedonics literature matter greatly for the positive
law of property. These insights supply a novel framework for
thinking about the governance of ownership. For example, the push
toward buying single-family homes—abetted by both government
rhetoric and legal enticements for prospective homeowners—may do
more to reduce than enhance subjective well-being. This suggests
that the federal government would be better off abandoning un-
differentiated tax relief for homeownership, and should instead
carefully calibrate incentives to encourage the kinds of acquisition
of residential property that are more likely to result in happiness.
Hedonics also points toward a bevy of other ways to nudge acquisi-
tion in the direction of greater happiness, from burdening purchase
decisions that unwittingly threaten our subjective well-being to
simply informing people about the nonobvious happiness upsides of
getting particular kinds of real or personal property.
The new psychology of hedonics shows that there actually is a big
difference between property and the pursuit of happiness, and that
the two are often at odds. But, as the Conclusion emphasizes, this
Article tells an optimistic story about property. It seeks to provide
a promising new way to think about property from a normative
perspective that indicates how we might regulate ownership to
enhance subjective well-being.
measured in dollars”); Leopold Kohr, Property and Freedom, in PROPERTY IN A HUMANE
ECONOMY 47, 50-52 (Samuel L. Blumenfeld ed., 1974) (discussing property as a source and
safeguard of individual autonomy); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV.
1889, 1894 (2005) (discussing property as a source of social bonds and interpersonal con-
nection); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982)
(regarding property as necessary to self-realization).
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This Article explores this novel territory in three steps. Part I
briefly outlines the new science of hedonic psychology in general
terms, and then investigates in detail the particular implications of
this new research for the acquisition and ownership of both real and
chattel property. Part II analyzes the implications of this research
for normative theories of property, showing how it both undermines
their foundations and provides a superior alternative for how to
think about governing property. Part III both identifies current
policies that are likely detracting from owners’ happiness and
suggests several ways to nudge property law in the opposite direc-
tion. Finally, the Conclusion reflects on the hopeful side of thinking
about property as a means to enhance our subjective well-being
rather than regarding possession as an end in itself. 
I. THE HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPERTY ACQUISITION
Why do we acquire property? One simple answer to this question
is that we do so because we think, consciously or not, that doing so
will make us better off. Whether it is a trivial piece of personal
property like a pen or a hamburger, or a costly investment like a car
or a single-family home, we get things because we believe that a
future in which we own those things will be preferable to one in
which we do not.12 But what does it mean for property ownership to
make us better off? One plausible account is that it enhances our
subjective sense of well-being—in other words, that we will feel
better with than without the things we acquire.13 Indeed, if someone
were to tell a potential purchaser that they would be persistently
less happy after purchasing a Big Mac or a McMansion, they would
likely (but not, as we will see, certainly) reconsider their choice. And
indeed, many studies from the burgeoning field of hedonic psychol-
ogy reveal that acquiring property—and in particular, luxury goods
and residential real estate—does not enhance, and in fact may
reduce, owners’ subjective well-being. This Part elaborates these
12. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 550, 553 (Sarah
Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006).
13. Gilbert and Wilson, for example, argue that what it means to want something is to
make a prediction that getting the object of desire will increase your affective state. Id. at 555-
56, 562.
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descriptive points in three steps: it introduces the (relatively) new
scientific study of happiness; it then briefly outlines the number of
ways that this work has been applied to law (though curiously, not
yet property law); and it catalogues research showing the deeply
conflicted relationship between property acquisition and subjective
well-being.
A. Hedonics: The New Science of Happiness
Until recently, the academic study of happiness was the province
of philosophers who debated the nature of well-being or clinical
psychologists who sought to help patients out of depressive states of
mind.14 But in the last forty-odd years, social psychologists have
begun to study happiness (or, as I will also refer to it throughout
this Article, subjective well-being15) as an empirical matter. These
studies have investigated what individual qualities and external
events cause our subjective well-being to increase or decrease, and
the extent to which these changes persist over time. The new
science of happiness—often termed “hedonics”—has entered popular
culture thanks to the universal appeal of the subject and the coun-
terintuitive nature of many of its findings.16 One of the best-known
studies looked at one group of people who had just won the lottery
and another group that had just become paralyzed in an accident.17
The surprising result was that a year after the life-changing event,
both the millionaires’ and the paraplegics’ happiness levels were
very close to what they had been before they were hit by strokes of
14. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE ELUSIVE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF WELL-BEING 3, 5-6 (2008).
15. There is much disagreement about this terminology among scholars. Happiness itself
is defined in two very different ways. One refers to an individual’s affective state—positive,
negative, or neutral—at any given moment of their life. See JOHN BRONSTEEN, CHRISTOPHER
BUCCAFUSCO & JOHNATHAN S. MASUR, HAPPINESS AND THE LAW 134 (2015) (defining hap-
piness as “the sum of positive and negative affective states”). The other approach looks to
overall life satisfaction rather than moment-by-moment affect to define happiness. And other
scholars resist the equation of happiness and well-being entirely. I discuss these alternative
approaches in detail later in this Part.
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, What You Can Learn from the New Science of Smarter Spend-
ing, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/114031/money-happiness-
and-new-science-smarter-spending [https://perma.cc/4YWP-SKN8].
17. See generally Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
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good or ill fate.18 Another well-known study surveyed people in the
Midwest and found that while they all predicted that they would be
happier if they moved to a sunny place like California, similar
people who already lived in California reported no greater happi-
ness than their Midwestern counterparts.19 And a social furor
erupted over a series of studies that seemed to show that people who
have children are less happy than those who do not.20
While the contemporary study of hedonics is a relatively recent
branch of social psychology, it has ancient precursors. Ancient
Greek and Chinese philosophers downplayed momentary states of
happiness in their view of the good life, lionizing instead self-denial
and other-regarding behavior in the interest of character-building
18. See id. at 920-21. Despite popular misconceptions to the contrary, the study did not
show that paraplegics reverted all the way back to their pre-accident levels of happiness, but
only that they adapted substantially. See id. Studies of kidney dialysis patients and pediatric
amputees, however, showed near-total reversion to previous levels of happiness. See Jason
Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological
Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 7-8 (2005); Vida L. Tyc, Psycho-
social Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb Deficiencies: A Review, 12 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 275, 275, 280 (1992).
19. See David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 341, 343
(1998). The surprising gap between the prediction and the reality of moving to California may
be explained by the tendency to focus excessively on one major feature of living in the Golden
State—great weather—and failure to realize that the day-to-day experiences that constitute
our subjective experience are about the same whether you live in San Diego or Des Plaines.
See id. at 345.
20. For an overview of the studies on this subject, see Robin W. Simon, The Joys of
Parenthood, Reconsidered, CONTEXTS, Spring 2008, at 40, 41-44 (concluding that the clear
majority of studies support the proposition that having children reduces happiness). There
is, for example, evidence that becoming a parent increases a person’s chances of becoming
clinically depressed, see Ranae J. Evenson & Robin W. Simon, Clarifying the Relationship
Between Parenthood and Depression, 46 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 341, 349-50 (2005), and a
longitudinal study showed that people reported much higher levels of subjective well-being
before having children than after, see Kei M. Nomaguchi & Melissa A. Milkie, Costs and
Rewards of Children: The Effects of Becoming a Parent on Adults’ Lives, 65 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 356, 356, 363-64 (2003). There is, however, recent work suggesting that parenthood may
be associated with certain kinds of increased happiness. See S. Katherine Nelson et al., In
Defense of Parenthood: Children Are Associated with More Joy than Misery, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI.
3, 4 (2013). This is, for obvious reasons, a charged debate that is still ongoing. For a fasci-
nating take on the social reaction to studies indicating that having children reduces parents’
subjective well-being, see Jennifer Senior, All Joy and No Fun: Why Parents Hate Parenting,
N.Y. MAG. (July 4, 2010), http://nymag.com/news/features/67024/ [https://perma.cc/K4MY-
4GWK].
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and virtuousness.21 This changed in the 1700s, when John Locke
and Jeremy Bentham, among others, began to look to individual
feelings of happiness as the touchstone of well-being.22 Bentham
argued that the best (and, indeed, only) measure of welfare was
utility, which scholars have since termed “experience utility”—that
is, an individual’s positive or negative psychological state at any
given time.23 Bentham thus argued that a person’s well-being over
the course of his or her life was the sum of these momentary
subjective feelings of happiness or unhappiness.24 Happiness-based
approaches to human psychology and social policy remained purely
theoretical for centuries, though, due to the absence of any means
of actually assessing individuals’ subjective well-being.25 
Modern scholars interested in hedonics, however, have now
developed a number of methods that have proved effective and
21. See generally Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/
ethics-virtue/ [https://perma.cc/7AZD-8WZG]; Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2016/entries/aristotle-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/Y3D3-TNYZ]. Aristotle, for example, disting-
uished different kinds of happiness. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On Happiness
and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOLOLOGY 141, 145-46 (2001). The momentary affective positive state this Article
refers to as “subjective well-being” was something Aristotle would have dismissed as mere
pleasure, while encouraging instead cultivation of a kind of higher-order happiness we might
call “excellence” or “civic virtue.” See id. at 143, 145-46. The word he used for this latter form
of happiness was “eudaimonia,” which modern scholars have adapted into a theory of well-
being (“eudaimonics”) inspired by Aristotelian virtue ethics. See id.; see also RICHARD LAYARD,
HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 22 (2005).
22. See, e.g., William Sweet, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), in INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (James Fieser et al. ed.), http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/ [https://perma.cc/
ZP86-DY79].
23. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 134; Daniel Read, Experienced Utility: Utility
Theory from Jeremy Bentham to Daniel Kahneman, 13 THINKING & REASONING 45, 46-47, 50-
51 (2007).
24. See Read, supra note 23, at 46-47. Bentham also translated this notion into the
“Greatest Happiness” principle for decision-making. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 4-5.
Pursuant to this principle, the best decision is the one that will maximize aggregate
happiness, regardless of its source or type. See id. at 5. Bentham famously said that “[p]rej-
udice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and
poetry.” JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD 206 (London, Robert Heward 1830).
25. The nineteenth-century economist Francis Edgeworth theorized a machine—the
“hedonimeter”—that would accurately assess people’s moment-by-moment affect. See David
Colander, Retrospectives: Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 2007, at 215, 215-17.
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reliable in measuring an individual’s subjective well-being. The
leading means of making this assessment is the experience sam-
pling method (ESM).26 ESM refers to any of a number of different
methodologies by which an individual’s moment-to-moment affect
is assessed in real time.27 Researchers also use surveys to measure
happiness, which typically ask subjects to think back on and report
their subjective well-being over the course of a recently concluded
day, week, or month.28 Although such retrospective surveys bring
certain advantages,29 they are also subject to memory failures and
cognitive biases that compromise their accuracy as meaningful
representations of subjects’ experienced well-being.30 And while it
may seem incoherent to quantify an abstraction like happiness,
hedonics research generally exhibits numerous hallmarks of sound
empirical work. For instance, when the same subjects are tested at
different times and under different circumstances, they tend to
report the same results.31 Reports of subjective well-being also
correlate with other indicia of happiness, such as frequent smiling,
smiling with the eyes, sleep quality, happiness ratings by third
parties (such as friends and family), and self-reported health.32
Researchers have also investigated and dismissed the possibility
that the term “happiness” means such different things to different
26. See Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755, 761 (2008) (describing ESM as the “gold standard” of measuring
experienced subjective well-being).
27. See generally JOEL M. HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASURING
THE QUALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE (2007) (providing an overview of ESM). This could entail giv-
ing respondents journals and asking them to note their affect at either a regular, predeter-
mined time (for example, after dinner) or at random times throughout the day. See id. at 35,
40. Cell phone applications are an increasingly popular way to perform ESM-based studies.
See id. at 37-39 (discussing the use of computers and PDAs to advance ESM research).
28. See Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 405, 410 (2010).
29. They may, for example, give a better sense of global happiness than ESM, a possibility
I discuss below. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; see also Huang, supra note 28,
at 407-08, 410 (discussing the pros and cons of surveys).
30. For example, psychologists have shown that when reporting on a past experience,
respondents tend to average the moment of peak intensity with the most recent moment,
rather than give an accurate sense of the average affect throughout the experience. See Daniel
Kahneman et al., Research Report, When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End,
4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 401, 402-04 (1993).
31. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-14 (discussing reliability of happiness
studies).
32. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 16.
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people (and especially those among different cultures) that any
differences in reported well-being are simply artifacts of language.33
And perhaps most compelling, neuropsychologists have used EEGs
to show that self-reports of the quality and intensity of affect (both
positive and negative) tend to match up with the areas of the brain
in which those responses register.34
But even if one assumes that these studies are reliable and valid,
what is this thing called “happiness” that they purport to measure?
While this notion may mean different things in other contexts, the
aforementioned research defines happiness as subjectively experi-
enced positive mental states.35 According to this approach, happi-
ness is simply net affect—how good (or bad) people feel in particular
moments.36 Our present consciousness consists of a series of con-
secutive moments, each of which lasts about three seconds.37 We can
describe these moments accurately when we are in them, but we
tend to forget what they were like soon after they pass.38 In light of
this reality, this Article embraces the definition of subjective well-
being as a person’s positive or negative affect during any given
moment of his or her life. To be happy, and have well-being, is to be
in a mental state that you would choose to continue.39 By contrast,
to be unhappy, and to lack well-being, is to be in a mental state that
you would prefer not to continue.40 This is a graduated rather than
33. For example, bilingual people in China and Switzerland gave consistent reports in
happiness surveys whether given in English, Mandarin, French, German, or Italian. See
LAYARD, supra note 21, at 33-34 (reporting results of two such studies).
34. See, e.g., Richard J. Davidson, Affective Style, Psychopathology, and Resilience: Brain
Mechanisms and Plasticity, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1196, 1202-03 (2000); Richard J. Davidson
et al., Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation: Perspectives from Affective Neuroscience,
126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 890, 897-98 (2000). For what it is worth, negative emotions are associated
with right frontal brain activity, while positive emotions are associated with left frontal brain
activity. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 11.
35. See, e.g., BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 134 (defining happiness as “the sum of
positive and negative affective states”).
36. See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based
Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673, 681 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000).
37. See Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis, Living, and Thinking About It: Two Perspectives
on Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 285, 285 (Felicia A. Huppert et al. eds., 2005).
38. See id. at 285-86.
39. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 12-13 (concluding that there is an essential mental state
called “happiness” that amounts to “enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be maintained”).
40. See id.
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a binary notion, so that this kind of subjective well-being can be,
and usually is, measured along a spectrum.41 This understanding of
happiness has been termed “experienced well-being” because it
seeks to evaluate affect on an immediate, nonintrospective basis.42
Critics of this perspective, though, have pointed out that the e-
quation of well-being with fleeting pleasures fails to take account of
more important concerns and values—faith, courage, love—that also
constitute well-being.43 Partially in response to these criticisms,
social psychologists have developed a different metric for happi-
ness—global well-being rather than experienced well-being—that
seeks to evaluate how happy people are with their lives upon re-
flection, and separately from their sense of well-being in a given
moment.44 So while the assessment of experienced well-being typi-
cally uses ESM and asks respondents, “How do you feel now?,”45 as-
sessing global well-being necessarily entails life satisfaction surveys
and asks respondents instead, “Upon reflection, how happy are you
with your life (or some aspect of it) overall?”46 This latter conception
constitutes a complementary rather than an exclusive metric for
subjective well-being, and a person may have one form of happiness
without the other.47 For example, spending hours watching reruns
of your favorite TV show may bring much moment-to-moment
41. Happiness studies thus usually ask respondents to self-report their well-being along
a scale of one through seven, with one representing the most unhappiness, seven the most
happiness, and four affective neutrality. See HEKTNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 48-49.
42. See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 37, at 286-87.
43. See Deirdre N. McCloskey, Happyism, NEW REPUBLIC (June 8, 2012), https://new
republic.com/article/103952/happyism-deirdre-mccloskey-economics-happiness [https://perma.
cc/5HPV-ARVD] (“Pleasure is a brain wave right now. Happiness is a good story of your life.”).
44. See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 37, at 285-87. For additional discussion of the dif-
ferent methods for measuring happiness, see generally Huang, supra note 28, at 407-12.
45. See, e.g., LAYARD, supra note 21, at 13-14.
46. Two leading happiness assessments, the Eurobarometer and the Gallup World Poll,
use this approach. See Peter H. Huang, Happiness in Business or Law, TRANSACTIONS, Spring
2011, at 153, 154-55 (describing various surveys, including the Eurobarometer survey and the
Gallup World Poll, that are designed to measure “a plethora of multiple possible conceptions
of happiness”); see also, e.g., Grace Wong Bucchianeri, The American Dream or the American
Delusion? The Private and External Benefits of Homeownership for Women 3, 5-8 (Apr. 1,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1877163 [https://perma.cc/7DRW-
NRRN] (using both moment-by-moment and global measures to assess the happiness of
homeowners versus renters).
47. See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 37, at 285-91 (explaining that the two conceptions
of happiness “are not always in perfect correspondence”).
2017] BUYING HAPPINESS 1865
happiness but cause you to report lower global well-being when you
look back on the day and regard it as utterly wasted.48 By contrast,
someone working at a soup kitchen may report low experienced
well-being during the task itself due to its difficulty but may well
report high global happiness afterward by virtue of feeling good
about having done something generous for others.49 Some scholars
have suggested that both measures be reported alongside one
another to give the richest possible sense of respondents’ happi-
ness.50 Others have rejoined that experienced well-being subsumes
global well-being. For example, if spending all day binge-watching
Better Call Saul makes one feel like her life is a waste or if working
at a soup kitchen produces a sense of self-satisfaction, these
negative and positive affective states should register somewhere in
one’s immediate experience and be captured by ESM.51
Other critics attack the very notion of measuring happiness,
whether defined experientially or globally.52 While space does not
permit a complete engagement with these criticisms, I pause to
consider two major objections here. One is that happiness is simply
too varied to be reduced to a scale with a single numerical metric.53
Most people would likely say that the birth of a child, or having your
favorite baseball team win the World Series, or finding that sock
you thought had been eaten by the dryer are all events that make
us “happy.” But it is at least plausible to ask—as some critics
have—whether the emotional states produced by these experiences
are so different that grouping them together as “happiness” and
placing them along the same spectrum produces an apples-to-
oranges comparison that renders study results using numerical
metrics meaningless.54 But this objection confuses the quality of




50. See, e.g., Kahneman & Riis, supra note 37, at 289.
51. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happi-
ness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1597-98 (2010).
52. See McCloskey, supra note 43.
53. See id. (“Happinesses are not fungible. Happinesses are multiple, dappled things, and
couple-colored.”).
54. See, e.g., id. John Stuart Mill, for example, did not believe that all happiness was
created equal, and his political philosophy was premised on distinctions between higher and
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feeling produced by a positive experience with the intensity of the
happiness produced by an experience.55 Hedonics seeks to assess
only the latter.56 So while eating a burger from L.A. institution
Tommy’s or dining at Chicago’s famed molecular gastronomy restau-
rant Alinea may be incomparable in many or even most respects,57
they are comparable to the extent that they produce some degree of
positive affect.58 Studies in a vast number of very different contexts
have found broad commensurability in the extent to which respon-
dents can assess how good or bad they feel in a given moment.59 So
while it is certainly true that the notion of “happiness” is capacious,
this does not automatically render it impossible to measure, at least
not when defined as it is in this Article. Indeed, we commonly use
such broad terms to facilitate understanding. We understand that
a person with $500,000 in stock owns a very different asset than
someone with $50,000 in cash, but no one would dispute that the
former possesses greater wealth.60 
Second, and relatedly, critics of hedonics have argued that even
if it is possible to measure an individual’s subjective well-being, it
is not possible to make meaningful comparisons among different
lower pleasures. See, e.g., LAYARD, supra note 21, at 22-23, 118. He criticized Bentham for
failing to take account of the varieties of happiness, saying, “Man, that most complex being,
is a very simple one in [Bentham’s] eyes.” JOHN STUART MILL, BENTHAM (1838), reprinted in
UTILITARIANISM AND ON LIBERTY 68, 69 (Mary Warnock ed., 2d ed. 2003).
55. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 13 (“[T]here are many different sources of enjoyment,
but we can compare the intensity of each.”).
56. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-14.
57. Cf. DANIEL M. HAYBRON, HAPPINESS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 103-05 (2013)
(contrasting happiness brought by consumption, such as of junk food, and happiness brought
by appreciation, such as of fine cuisine).
58. In other words, instead of saying “Tommy’s and Alinea are so different that they
cannot be compared,” it is possible and indeed more accurate to say “Tommy’s makes Joe feel
good, but Alinea makes him feel even better.”
59. See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 8 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (summarizing several such
studies and concluding on that basis that “it appears that most moments of experience can
be adequately characterized by a single summary value on the [Good-Bad] dimension”); see
also Ingebjørg Kristoffersen, The Metrics of Subjective Wellbeing: Cardinality, Neutrality and
Additivity, 86 ECON. REC. 98, 99, 103-04, 113-14, 118-20 (2010) (defending the capacity of
happiness to be scaled universally and compared meaningfully).
60. We also commensurate different-seeming options all the time in our daily lives. Forced
to choose between going to a Judd Apatow movie with one group of friends or the New York
Philharmonic with another, we simply compare along some metric or another and pick one. 
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subjects’ reported well-being.61 After all, they argue, Freud’s
pleasure principle states that our happiness depends to a large
extent on our baseline expectations.62 It is at least plausible that
two people who experience the same actual amount of pleasure may
attach a different numeric value to it, and some have argued that
this possibility robs hedonics studies of any universal lessons.63
Studies investigating this possibility have found, however, that even
very differently situated people tend to give both cardinal and
ordinal rankings to conditions that are very similar, suggesting that
the numbers people assign to the affect associated with similar
experiences tend to be uniform.64 There will inevitably be some
degree of variance between individuals. Not every person’s five on
a scale will refer to precisely the same degree of subjective affect as
another’s five. But in the aggregate, these random variations tend
to wash out.65 Because this Article limits itself to general statements
about the impact of property law and policy on subjective well-being,
those random variations do not undermine its overall conclusions.
61. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62
DUKE L.J. 1509, 1552-56 (2013).
62. See SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 1 (Ernest Jones ed., C.J.M.
Hubback trans., 1922) (“[T]he course of mental processes is automatically regulated by ‘the
pleasure-principle’: that is to say, we believe that any given process originates in an unpleas-
ant state of tension and thereupon determines for itself such a path that its ultimate issue
coincides with a relaxation of this tension.”).
63. Deirdre McCloskey, for example, suggests that people in First World countries would
consistently report low affect resulting from experiences that would cause people in impov-
erished parts of the world to report much higher affect. McCloskey, supra note 43. Even
believers in hedonics have acknowledged difficulty making such cross-cultural comparisons.
See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 37, at 297-98. Because this Article limits its scope only to
U.S. property law and policy, though, this criticism is not particularly relevant.
64. See Heather P. Lacey et al., Are They Really That Happy? Exploring Scale
Recalibration in Estimates of Well-Being, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 669, 672-74 (2008) (finding
that patients experiencing health problems assigned equivalent cardinal and ordinal nu-
merical rankings to similar possible maladies).
65. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 45-47 (considering concerns about differential
use of happiness reporting scales and concluding that such variations “are likely to be ran-
dom, not biased,” and that such “randomness should wash out across large numbers of
people”).
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B. Happiness, Law, and Property
1. Happiness and Law
These new and often surprising insights about what increases
and decreases subjective well-being—and how those changes in
happiness persist over time—have been applied to law in a number
of novel and revealing ways. Some of this work explores specific
legal implications of particular findings by hedonics scholars.
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, for example, have argued that,
because accident victims are likely to adapt to their injuries within
about a year, the sum that plaintiffs in tort suits are willing to
accept as compensation decreases over time, and the chances of
settlement increase.66 These authors have also used the notion of
hedonic adaptation to contend that prisoners suffer substantially
more during the first year of their sentence, with the troubling
implication that a year-long sentence for a relatively smaller offense
may inflict relatively greater harm to an inmate’s well-being than
a ten-year sentence for a much worse crime.67 Samuel Bagenstos
and Margo Schlanger have leveraged the literature on affective
forecasting to demonstrate that when assessing damages for dis-
abled tort victims juries of able-bodied people tend to inflate awards
due to an inaccurate and normatively undesirable failure to predict
the extent to which the disabled adapt to their new circumstances.68
Thomas Griffith showed that the weak relationship between
increased wealth and subjective well-being provides a compelling
justification for progressive tax policy.69 And numerous scholars
have explored well-being analysis as an alternative to the familiar
use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory policy.70
66. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Essay, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1518 (2008).
67. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038, 1048-49 (2009).
68. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 752 (2007).
69. See Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363,
1365, 1398 (2004).
70. Compare John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1607-08, 1615-16 (2013) (proposing
evaluation of public policy in terms of “well-being analysis” rather than the traditionally
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The explosion of academic interest in subjective well-being has
produced a correlative move in legal scholarship toward accounting
for the insights of this new literature.71 Yet despite the scholarship
applying the new hedonic psychology to torts, civil procedure,
criminal law, and disability rights, there remains one glaring area
in which happiness remains unexplored: property. This absence is
especially conspicuous because the notions of property and happi-
ness are culturally and socially intertwined. As the examples
catalogued in the introduction illustrate, modern American culture
often implicitly equates acquiring property with happiness.72 At the
very least, it seems that people tend to believe that getting more
things will make them feel better off.73 Otherwise, why would there
be such a strong social push in the direction of constant material
acquisition? And the relevance of the connection (or lack thereof)
between property and happiness is intensely relevant to law as a
result of the law’s aggressive protection and promotion of property
ownership and acquisition. But is it true that acquiring and owning
property will make us better off? Hedonics allows us to supply an
evidence-based answer to this question, with the result being that
the relationship between property and happiness is at best deeply
conflicted.
2. Property and (Un)happiness
Thousands of years ago, Epicurus argued that it was indifference
toward acquisition, rather than the possession of things, that was
both a great virtue and a source of true happiness.74 This insight
preferred cost-benefit analysis), with Adler, supra note 61, at 1564-65, 1599 (expressing
skepticism about well-being analysis as a means of analyzing public policy).
71. See Adler, supra note 61, at 1511 (“‘Happiness’ is all the rage.”).
72. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
73. See Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 12, at 550-53 (averring that wanting something is
tantamount to making a prediction that it will improve our mental state).
74. See Leaf Van Boven, Experientialism, Materialism, and the Pursuit of Happiness, 9
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 132, 132 (2005) (quoting Epicurus as having written, “[W]e regard
independence of outward things as a great good ... so as to be contented with little if we have
not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who
stand least in need of it”). Similarly, Democritus argued that, “By desiring little, a poor man
makes himself rich.” See 1 WILLIAM ENFIELD, THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 431 (London, J.F.
Dove 1819) (quoting the maxims of Democritus). There are countless aphorisms for this
proposition and its opposite. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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may not have much cultural purchase in affluenza-crazed modern
America,75 and, in all fairness, it does seem intuitive that wealth
would lead to greater subjective well-being. This is not because hav-
ing money automatically should make us feel happy,76 but because
wealth tends to create the ability to acquire the objects of one’s
desire, avoid negative experiences, and have security against pos-
sible misfortunes. Nevertheless, numerous studies have confirmed
Epicurus’s take on the matter. For the most part, studies have found
at best a weak relationship between wealth and moment-to-moment
happiness.77 Moreover, the most positive correlations between
increased income and happiness occur below the threshold where
basic living needs are met. So in the United States, for example, the
relationship between experienced well-being and household income
evaporates once the latter reaches $75,000 per year.78 And even
75. For a discussion of “affluenza” and “Gross Domestic Happiness” as an alternative
measure of national well-being, see generally JOHN DE GRAAF ET AL., AFFLUENZA: HOW OVER-
CONSUMPTION IS KILLING US—AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK (3d ed. 2014).
76. Though it may, at least temporarily; consider the apoplectic joy of Publishers Clearing
House Sweepstakes lottery winners when they saw Ed McMahon on their front porch with
an oversized novelty check. See Larissa Faw, The Curious Case of Ed McMahon and the
Publishers Clearing House, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
larissafaw/2012/11/21/the-curious-case-of-ed-mcmahon-and-the-publishers-clearing-house/
[https://perma.cc/3D48-JX83].
77. This is commonly termed the “Easterlin paradox.” See Richard A. Easterlin, Does
Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND
HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 89, 118-19 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974).
This paradox has spawned many, many studies on the conflicted relationship between hap-
piness and wealth. For one summary of them, see LAYARD, supra note 21, at 41-54 (citing
numerous studies for the proposition that increased income has a negligible effect on
subjective well-being after a subsistence point). For a more equivocal take on the issue, see
ED DIENER & ROBERT BISWAS-DIENER, HAPPINESS: UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIES OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WEALTH 110-11 (2008) (concluding that “it is generally good for your
happiness to have money, but toxic to your happiness to want money too much”).
Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers have recently claimed to rebut the Easterlin paradox,
though their findings are based on evidence that increased wealth does increase global, not
moment-by-moment, happiness. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth
and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 1, 60. Importantly, though, the effect size of these results is limited,
so that the most this work shows is that huge increases in wealth lead to only modest
increases in (one kind of) happiness. See id. at 70-71. And other recent work continues to
confirm that increased wealth does not have much impact (beyond a certain threshold) on
moment-by-moment happiness. See Huang, supra note 28, at 409-10 (summarizing this
research).
78. See, e.g., Belinda Luscombe, Do We Need $75,000 a Year to Be Happy?, TIME (Sept. 6,
2010), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2019628,00.html [https://perma.
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below that threshold, increases in income show much lower impacts
on happiness than people predict.79 Another surprising finding is
that longitudinal studies of subjective well-being in the United
States show a relatively constant level of well-being from about the
end of the Second World War to the present time—despite substan-
tial and constant increases in GDP over this period.80
These studies refer to only general increases in income, though
they are relevant to this Article because wealthier people obviously
tend to purchase more property. But even if simply getting richer in
pure monetary terms does not make us happier, it remains possible
that acquisition of chattel or real property—and in particular,
getting the “American dream” in the form of one’s own home—may
have different and positive effects on subjective well-being.81 Yet
here too, studies confound cultural expectations. Two scholars re-
cently commented after a survey of the available evidence that
“[r]emarkably, there is almost no evidence that buying a home—or
cc/ZKN6-MNVN]; cf. LAYARD, supra note 21, at 3 (collecting studies and concluding that “as
Western societies have got richer, their people have become no happier”). Wealth may,
though, have some positive impact on global well-being. See Daniel Kahneman & Angus
Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 16,489, 16,490-92 (2010).
79. A study of Americans revealed that while people predicted that their happiness would
double if they made $55,000 instead of $25,000, people who earned the former amount were
actually only slightly happier than those who earned the latter amount. Lara B. Aknin et al.,
From Wealth to Well-Being? Money Matters, but Less Than People Think, 4 J. POSITIVE
PSYCHOL. 523, 524-26 (2009).
80. See SONJA LYUBOMIRSKY, THE MYTHS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT SHOULD MAKE YOU HAPPY,
BUT DOESN’T, WHAT SHOULDN’T MAKE YOU HAPPY, BUT DOES 276 (2014). What explains the
surprisingly weak relationship between wealth and happiness? Two factors commonly cited
are individuals’ tendency to hedonically adapt to material possessions and the extent to which
well-being is contextual, so that overall increasing wealth (as in the case of rising GDP) does
not make people feel relatively better off compared to their friends and neighbors, even
though they are wealthier in an absolute sense. See id. at 148. Recent work has shown that
the effect of any impact of national income growth on happiness is trivial. Cf. Edsel L. Beja,
Jr., Income Growth and Happiness: Reassessment of the Easterlin Paradox, 61 INT’L REV.
ECONOMICS 329, 341-42 (2014) (explaining how adaptation to income and social comparison
have “very little oomph” in terms of the impact of income growth on happiness).
81. While much of the ensuing discussion is specific to real property, the analysis applies
to chattels, especially luxury goods, as well. Buying a trendy subzero refrigerator or a fancy
new surround-sound system is likely subject to hedonic adaptation, leading to buyer’s
remorse, and may reduce your net happiness—especially if you deepen your debt by buying
it on credit. See White, supra note 9 (summarizing happiness studies showing that purchasing
consumer goods led to a materialistic mindset and lowered subjective well-being).
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a newer, nicer home—increases happiness.”82 One study of contem-
porary Germans, for example, found no increase in overall life
satisfaction among a cohort of people who purchased new homes
because they were dissatisfied with their previous residences.83
Another survey in Ohio similarly reported no increase in happiness
among homeowners; it actually found that along certain metrics—
such as health—homeowners compared unfavorably to similarly-
situated renters.84 And a study found that first-year Harvard
students predicted that they would have much higher happiness
levels if they were assigned to desirable rather than undesirable
upper-class housing.85 Yet when the researchers contacted the same
students later in their college years, they found no relationship
between their actual happiness and their residence in a more or less
desirable dorm.86 Researchers have found the same results with
respect to chattel property, and in particular luxury goods. A study
of prospective car purchasers found that they overwhelmingly
agreed that buying a luxury car would make them better off than
getting a standard vehicle.87 Yet when drivers of luxury cars were
surveyed, those who had decided to purchase a high-end auto
reported no greater happiness than those who did not.88
These results fly in the face of popular wisdom that purchasing
a home is an indispensable part of the good life—a view that
persists even after the mortgage crisis of 2008.89 So what can
82. DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 2.
83. See Naoki Nakazato et al., Effect of Changes in Living Conditions on Well-Being: A
Prospective Top-Down Bottom-Up Model, 100 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 115, 129-31 (2011). The
evidence did show that the new homeowners reported increased satisfaction with their new
homes; nevertheless, they reported no greater overall life satisfaction. Id. at 129.
84. See Bucchianeri, supra note 46, at 5-6, 16-17, 23 (discussing health differentials in
survey subjects).
85. See Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Location, Location, Location: The Misprediction of
Satisfaction in Housing Lotteries, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1421, 1422, 1424-
25, 1429 (2003).
86. See id. at 1422-25, 1429. This study is especially helpful because first-year students
are randomly assigned to different upper-class housing, and there is a widely shared
consensus that some of those dorms are more desirable than others. See id. at 1422.
87. See Norbert Schwarz & Jing Xu, Why Don’t We Learn from Poor Choices? The
Consistency of Expectation, Choice, and Memory Clouds the Lessons of Experience, 21 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 142, 143-44 (2011).
88. See id.
89. Even after the devastating housing crash of the last decade, a 2011 study sponsored
by Fannie Mae and widely reported by realtors’ associations confirmed that nine in every ten
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explain this divergence? The answer lies in the many insights
generated by recent research on human happiness. Perhaps the
leading finding of this literature is the prevalence of “hedonic
adaptation.” Numerous studies have confirmed that the effect of
positive and negative life events is far more limited than we tend to
predict, both in terms of the temporary effect that such events have
and in terms of our “psychological immune system” that causes us
to revert to whatever level of well-being we had before such events.90
The acquisition of material goods, and especially houses, is one of
the classic examples of something to which humans tend to adapt
because such goods are static and unchanging.91 So we tend to
imagine that living in more square footage, or having a pool in our
own back yard, or using a dual subzero fridge will make our lives
permanently and noticeably better. But once we move into that new
home, all those fancy features quickly become part of the back-
ground of our daily lives, and our well-being tends to migrate back
toward whatever it was before the home purchase.92 Hedonic adap-
tation also tends to dampen any subjective well-being created by the
purchase of chattel property, especially luxury items like fancy cars,
expensive jewelry, or the latest electronics. “The things that we get
used to most easily and most take for granted,” wrote happiness
people still believed that owning a home remained an essential part of the American dream,
even if the value of their own home had fallen dramatically. See David Streitfeld & Megan
Thee-Brenan, Despite Fears, Owning Home Retains Allure, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/business/30poll.html [https://perma.cc/X29U-
LZFQ].
90. For a good overview of the hedonic adaptation literature, see Shane Frederick &
George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 59, at 302, 311-13.
91. See Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
11,176, 11,181-82 (2003) (explaining that once purchasers acquire material goods such as a
home, their expectations adjust so that those goods become a mere condition of their life
rather than a long-held aspiration, thereby adding no net life happiness); Michelle Higgins,
Homeownership, the Key to Happiness?, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/14/realestate/homeownership-the-key-to-happiness.html [https://perma.cc/XP2D-
2BS2] (“Like any possession, [a home’s] impact on happiness diminishes over time.” (quoting
Professor Ravi Dhar, Director of the Center for Customer Insights at Yale School of
Management)).
92. See Higgins, supra note 91 (explaining that “[w]hat matters for our happiness ... is
what we do in the minutes and hours of our day,” and that “[w]hether you have a maple or a
walnut floor” will not have a big impact on your day-to-day experience (quoting Elizabeth
Dunn, Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of British Columbia)).
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scholar Richard Layard, “are our material possessions—our car, our
house.”93
By unfortunate contrast, though, one negative fact to which hu-
mans have not been shown to hedonically adapt is debt, perhaps
because debt reminds us of its existence in constant, unpleasantly
surprising ways—repeated loan payments, unexpected jumps in the
adjustable interest rate, or the realization that certain other acqui-
sitions or experiences are foreclosed due to lack of funds.94 Mortgage
debt in particular tends to be especially suffocating due to its dis-
proportionate size, which tends to be psychologically burdensome
and also reduces real income so that homeowners have less financial
freedom to engage in the kinds of experiences that are more likely
to lead to greater happiness.95 Finally, the psychological downsides
of heavy debt loads threaten to swamp any positive affect derived
from the purchased property due to the unfortunate but well-
documented fact that negative factors associated with an event tend
to depress our well-being more than positive ones enhance it.96
“[W]hat we owe,” caution Dunn and Norton, “is a bigger predictor of
our happiness than what we make.”97
Several other key findings of hedonic psychology also help to
explain why acquisition may reduce happiness. One major conclu-
sion of the happiness literature is that acquisition makes us happier
when it is parceled out over time. Eating a candy bar slowly and
thoughtfully, one bite a day (as per the protagonist in Charlie and
the Chocolate Factory98), will likely generate more happiness than
93. LAYARD, supra note 21, at 49.
94. Cf. DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 96-97 (noting that constant reminders of what
we owe can take particularly large tolls on our subjective well-being).
95. See generally Leigh Ann Leung & Catherine Lau, Effect of Mortgage Indebtedness on
Health of U.S. Homeowners, REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD, May 2014 (reporting results of study
showing relationship between high mortgage debt and adverse mental health outcomes, such
as depression).
96. See LYUBOMIRSKY, supra note 80, at 151 (“[T]wo decades of research has demonstrated
that we net a much bigger emotional ‘hit’ from negative experiences ... than we obtain a boost
from positive experiences.”). 
97. DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 95 (collecting studies showing that members of
households with greater debt levels exhibit lower happiness).
98. Charlie, whose poverty meant that candy bars were a rare treat, would eat each bar
by taking just a “tiny nibble” at a time. See id. at 31-32 (discussing Charlie and the Chocolate
Factory as an illustration of their forced deprivation strategy for happier consumption).
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scarfing the thing down all at once.99 But large, “lumpy” goods like
houses, cars, and jewelry,100 of course, are impossible to consume
pursuant to this kind of forced deprivation strategy.101 Acquiring
“lumpy” goods requires massive, one-time purchases that cannot
be parceled out over time, and such big-ticket items are thus less
likely to generate happiness bang for the buck.102 Houses and luxury
goods in particular are subject to two features that reduce the
happiness produced by material goods: status comparisons and
buyer’s remorse. Single-family homes (and luxury goods like cars
or jewelry) often function as positional goods.103 That is, the appeal
of a home or a high-end good depends not only on its intrinsic
qualities, but also on how it compares to the homes or comparable
goods of peers. So, for example, if someone buys a house with all the
features she desired only to discover that all of her neighbors’ homes
are even fancier, she may well feel unhappy with the purchase
even though the house remains appealing on objective terms.104
Personal property in particular tends to be vulnerable to a process
by which we idealize goods before we possess them, but suddenly
see all their flaws once they are officially ours—buyer’s remorse,
in common parlance.105 This tendency is especially pronounced
with respect to house and car purchases, in which the sales process
99. See Carey K. Morewedge et al., Mispredicting the Hedonic Benefits of Segregated
Gains, 136 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 700, 707 (2007) (noting that research subjects
predicted larger gains in well-being from experiences parceled out over time rather than
consumed all at once).
100. See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1958-62 (2012)
(characterizing goods that are valuable only if they are acquired wholesale, rather than
incrementally, as “lumpy”).
101. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 27-52 (discussing this parceled out consump-
tion strategy).
102. Cf. id. (collecting studies supporting this point).
103. This may explain why people rate their predicted happiness from owning luxury goods
at high levels only to find that the day-to-day experience of using such goods does not actually
generate much more happiness. Cf. Schwarz & Xu, supra note 87, at 142-44 (explaining how
consumers mistakenly believe that their purchasing decisions will increase their happiness).
104. In a truly astonishing illustration of the positional-good phenomenon, half of the
subjects in a study reported that they would rather make 50 percent less in real income if
their income could be substantially higher in relative terms to coworkers’. See Sara J. Solnick
& David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Survey on Positional Concerns, 37 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 380-81 (1998).
105. See Travis J. Carter & Thomas Gilovich, The Relative Relativity of Material and
Experiential Purchases, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 153-56 (2010) (discussing
the tendency of material goods acquisitions to be diminished by regret).
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can be competitive and rushed, so that it is only when a purchaser
has finally taken title to her new home or vehicle that she has
occasion to contemplate the wisdom and appeal of her acquisition.106
Finally, in terms of homeownership in particular, one might
wonder whether all the costs that homeownership may impose on
subjective well-being may be overborne by the increased wealth that
an investment in a single-family home can bring. Of course, this
intuition runs up against the numerous studies showing that wealth
does not seem to bring more subjective well-being after a subsis-
tence point.107 And, as the housing crash of the late 2000s illus-
trated, houses do not guarantee a positive return on investment,
and decreases in value can economically devastate homeowners.108
Even if a house increases in value massively, this does not necessar-
ily guarantee happiness, not only because of the conflicted relation-
ship between wealth and happiness discussed above, but also
because being literally surrounded by a reminder of one’s wealth
may lead to an outsized focus on oneself and one’s possessions.109
This kind of myopic focus on one’s material wealth tends to be
strongly associated with low subjective well-being.110
3. Toward Happier Acquisition
The implication of the foregoing findings may appear to be that
acquiring wealth—and in particular real property—does not equal
106. Cf. Richard H. Thaler, Feature, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191,
193-94 (1988) (discussing the tendency to overbid in auction scenarios).
107. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
108. In fact, Yale housing economist Robert Schiller reports that, when adjusted for
inflation, home prices in the United States have remained essentially flat since World War
II. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 20 (2d ed. 2005).
109. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 74-75 (explaining that constant reminders of
material wealth tend to make us think more about status and wealth acquisition but less
about things that tend to make us happy, like socialization); LYUBOMIRSKY, supra note 80, at
168-69 (summarizing research showing that acquiring wealth makes us more desirous for and
conscious of additional wealth).
110. Materialistic people report less satisfying and meaningful lives, poorer social relation-
ships, and higher incidence of insecurity, and are less liked by others. See Belk, supra note
9, at 274. One reason for this relationship may be that higher consciousness of one’s own
wealth tends to be associated with higher cortisol levels, which make individuals feel unhap-
pier and also lead to higher rates of heart disease. Cf. Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 78,
at 16,492 (concluding that high income is more closely related to satisfaction with life than
actual improvement in emotional well-being).
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happiness. But the story is more complicated than that. There are
circumstances under which acquiring property leads to greater
happiness. What matters is intention: how and why the acquisition
happens.111 So consider, for example, the finding that while spend-
ing money on the acquisition of material things does not generate
(and may reduce) subjective well-being, spending money on ex-
periences (traveling, attending concerts, dining out at memorable
restaurants with friends) does.112 Experiences, unlike things, tend
to grow more rather than less appealing in retrospect,113 and have
proved to be impervious to positional comparison, buyer’s remorse,
and other factors that lead purchases of real and chattel property to
disappoint us.114 How might this insight affect the acquisition of real
property? One psychologist, aware of these findings, used them as
a benchmark when searching for a new home.115 He and his wife
downplayed the physical amenities to which real estate agents con-
stantly draw attention and instead prioritized a house with access
to hiking trails.116 They reported that the home purchase has im-
proved their access to a favorite activity and that they are happier
for it.117
Another implication of the literature on property and happiness
is that we may be better off when we use our money to buy time, not
111. The highly influential book by Dunn and Norton reporting the oft-negative
relationship between property acquisition and happiness was titled Happy Money: The Science
of Happier Spending because it suggests specific acquisition strategies that can enhance
rather than degrade subjective well-being. See generally DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10.
112. See Leaf Van Boven & Thomas Gilovich, To Do or to Have? That Is the Question, 85
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1193, 1196 (2003) (finding that when asked to compare
relative happiness resulting from experiential versus material purchases, 57 percent of
respondents reported that the former made them happier while only 34 percent reported that
the latter made them happier). See generally DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 5-25
(summarizing the results of many studies showing that spending money on experiences tends
to make us happier than spending money on things).
113. However, some work suggests that the total effect of memories on our well-being,
while positive, is limited. See Terence R. Mitchell et al., Temporal Adjustments in the
Evaluation of Events: The “Rosy View,” 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 421, 446 (1997).
114. See Van Boven & Gilovich, supra note 112, at 1199 (observing that while material
objects fade in their owners’ estimation over time, memory tends to burnish experiences to
make them seem even better than they actually were).
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things.118 Homes in particular may generate capital appreciation but
this can be overborne by their reduction in “time affluence.”119
Owning a home can eat up one’s free time in terms of upkeep and
commuting. This is a doubly bad tradeoff. Not only is the reduction
in free time itself harmful to subjective well-being,120 but the kinds
of activities that typically eat up homeowners’ free time—commut-
ing and housework—are among those that have been shown to have
the worst effect on individual happiness.121 These insights, too,
translate into smarter real-property acquisition strategies. One
happiness scholar reports that she consciously chose to buy a
smaller condominium nearer to her university in lieu of a more
luxurious home in an outlying area.122 This move supplanted a
happiness-suffocating commute with a quick (and healthy) bicycle
trip to work each day.123
Property acquisition can generate subjective well-being when it
is done in service of furthering the one factor that most hedonics
scholars agree is most strongly associated with greater subjective
well-being: social relationships.124 So acquiring a house as a site to
facilitate family gatherings is more conducive to happiness than
doing so with an eye toward status and wealth.125 And seeking to
118. See generally DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 53-78 (summarizing results of
various studies showing strong connection between free time and subjective well-being).
119. Cf. Tim Kasser & Kennon M. Sheldon, Time Affluence as a Path Toward Personal
Happiness and Ethical Business Practice: Empirical Evidence from Four Studies, 84 J. BUS.
ETHICS 243, 243-44 (2009) (proposing that businesses adopt “time affluence” models to
enhance employee well-being).
120. See id. at 244 (showing that increases in free time were directly related to reports of
greater subjective well-being).
121. See Higgins, supra note 91; see also DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 63-65.
122. See Higgins, supra note 91.
123. See id.
124. While commuting and housework are at the bottom of the happiness index, people
report their highest psychological affect during time spent with family and friends. See Alan
B. Krueger, Are We Having More Fun Yet? Categorizing and Evaluating Changes in Time
Allocation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2007, at 193, 203.
125. Even the admirable aim of buying a fancy home for one’s family comes with hidden
happiness costs because it may require parents to work longer hours and deal with brutal
commutes that make it harder to spend quality time with their family. A 2003 poll of
Americans illustrated the irony: 80 percent of those polled said they wished they could spend
more time with their families, and that they would take a pay cut to do so. See Americans
Eager to Take Back Their Time, NEW AM. DREAM (Aug. 2003), http://205.153.117.210/about/
polls/timepoll.php [https://perma.cc/23W7-V97F]. But those polled also said they could not af-
ford a pay cut because they needed to make enough money to support their family—citing
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live in an area near one’s social or familial network is more likely to
enhance well-being than scouting for a place in a socially prestigious
or aesthetically pleasing neighborhood. Other studies have found
that giving away one’s property to charities is enormously beneficial
to happiness.126 The twist, though, is that charitable donations have
to be made with the sincere intentions of benefiting some cause
rather than oneself. If you give away your vacation home or fancy
car solely for a tax break, or out of guilt-ridden obligation, such
instrumental conduct is unlikely to have the desired effect on
happiness.127 
* * * 
For some time, philosophers have cautioned that however much
we may desire material acquisition, it will not make us happier.
Recent advances in hedonic psychology have allowed us to test this
proposition empirically. The result: the ancients had it mostly right.
Simply getting more stuff, including and especially real property,
does not increase our subjective well-being, and under many
circumstances may actually decrease it. The short-term psychologi-
cal lift from buying real or chattel property quickly fades due to
hedonic adaptation, and may be replaced by debt anxiety, mainte-
nance costs, buyer’s remorse, and incipient materialism that result
in a longer-term reduction in subjective well-being. But this does not
mean that property always makes us miserable; acquisition with a
mind toward maintaining “time affluence” and enabling memorable
experiences can enhance happiness, and sometimes simply giving
away what we own can create more subjective well-being. These
fascinating findings have, surprisingly, gone almost entirely unre-
marked in the legal literature on property. The ensuing two Parts
housing costs as the leading barrier. Id.
126. One cross-cultural study has shown that people feel much happier when they use their
money to help others than when they keep it for themselves. See Lara B. Aknin et al.,
Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal,
104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 646-47 (2013). Billionaire Warren Buffet recently
pledged to give away 99 percent of his wealth to charities and reports that he “couldn’t be
happier” with the decision. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 106.
127. See William T. Harbaugh et al., Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving
Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, 316 SCIENCE 1622, 1624 (2007).
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explore the implications for the troubled nexus of ownership and
happiness for property theory and law, respectively.
II. HAPPINESS AND PROPERTY THEORY
Why do we have property? In particular, why does law facilitate
the acquisition of property? Scholars have developed a number of
different theories to answer these hard questions, looking to consid-
erations such as wealth maximization, self-expression, autonomy,
and community.128 Despite their stark differences, these frameworks
share two common features. First, they are normative;129 that is,
they seek to tell us why we value the social and legal institution of
ownership and, ideally, how ownership rights should be allocated.
Second, they rely centrally on untested empirical premises about
how the acquisition of property affects owners and nonowners alike.
One such premise, for example, is that acquiring real or chattel
property makes us freer or provides a critical outlet for self-
expression. This Part uses the hedonics research outlined in the
previous Part to make two contributions to the scholarly dialogue
about the ideal normative approach to property. The first is that
acquisition’s fraught relationship with subjective well-being chal-
lenges central factual premises on which leading normative property
theories rely, thus seriously complicating the coherence of those
theories. Second, it considers how happiness might work as a frame-
work for thinking about how we should govern ownership, conclud-
ing that while more evidence is needed, the impact of property
128. For a good, brief overview, see SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 11, at 1-8
(collecting and summarizing five normative theories of property).
129. By contrast, many scholars have engaged the separate descriptive question of what
property is. For example, Tony Honoré sought to define property in terms of a series of
distinctive incidents such as the rights to possess, use, and manage. A.M. Honoré, Ownership,
in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 557, 563-74 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1999). Thomas
Merrill, by contrast, defined property rights solely in terms of the right to exclude. Thomas
W. Merrill, Essay, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (stating
that the right to exclude is the “sine qua non” of property).
The normative theories of property that are the concern of this Part seek both to “provide
a normative justification for allocating [rights to material resources] in a particular way,” and
“to specify the content of property rights at various levels of generality—for example, the
contours of the owner’s right to exclude others from various kinds of property.” See GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 6-7 (2012).
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acquisition on subjective well-being should be a critical input into
any discussion about allocative theories of property.
A. A Happiness Critique of Leading Property Theories
The surprising insight that property and happiness may lie at
odds has troubling implications for the leading theories of property.
This Section considers four such theories: utilitarianism, person-
hood, autonomy, and community. In each case, hedonics has desta-
bilized central factual premises of each of these theories.
1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, according to a leading property coursebook, “is,
without doubt, the dominant view of property today, at least among
lawyers.”130 And while there are a number of different formulations
of utilitarianism,131 a central and simple proposition on which many
property scholars agree is that ownership rights should be allocated
in order to maximize net social welfare.132 This broad notion raises
a number of difficult questions about aggregation and distribution,
but it also poses an ultimate definitional inquiry: what is the best
measure of welfare? As we have seen, Bentham, the father of
utilitarianism, defined individual welfare as the sum of pleasure or
displeasure that any given person felt at any given time.133 Yet by
the late 1800s, the absence of a direct measure of an individual’s
positive or negative affect led scholars to focus on measuring an
individual’s well-being by looking at her behavior instead.134
Decisional conduct possesses intuitive appeal as a proxy measure of
subjective well-being. I may not know if someone actually is made
130. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 50 (7th ed. 2010).
131. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 11 (“[T]he term utilitarian masks a
great deal of intellectual and methodological diversity.”). 
132. See id. at 11 n.2. In this respect, it is possible to speak of utilitarianism as a welfarist
theory insofar as it is concerned with the outcomes of social policy on well-being. See id.
Importantly, though, this does not mean that utilitarianism and welfarism are identical, but
rather that utilitarianism is a species of welfarism. See id. (“[C]lassical utilitarianism is
properly understood as a species of welfarism, the broader category.”).
133. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
134. See Colander, supra note 25, at 216 (discussing the rise of behaviorism in terms of the
failure of social scientists to identify a more direct measure of well-being).
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better off by eating an apple or an orange, but if I present him with
one of each and he selects the latter, then it is plausible to assume
that he derives more enjoyment from eating oranges than apples.
This behaviorist turn in social science became dominant through the
early twentieth century, epitomized by B.F. Skinner’s experiments
modifying the behavior of rats.135 This was especially true in
economics, in which welfare increasingly became defined as the
extent to which people could get what they wanted—a vision of
welfare that has become known as “preferentism.” In addition to the
consensus that individual decisions evidenced “revealed prefer-
ences,” social scientists argued that wealth represented the best
available measure of well-being, since it translated directly into the
ability to satisfy one’s preferences.136 This standard remains prom-
inent in social science today, exemplified by the use of willingness
to pay and willingness to accept certain prices as proxies for indi-
viduals’ relative levels of utility derived from trade.137
The development of the utilitarian approach to property law
roughly mirrored this trend. Just as twentieth-century economists
tended to conflate wealth and well-being,138 property law’s utili-
tarians—who were heavily influenced by the law and economics
movement—implicitly or explicitly assumed that increased acquisi-
tion of property was synonymous with greater welfare.139 Richard
135. See B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 198-202 (1971); see also LAYARD,
supra note 21, at 127-28 (discussing the behaviorist turn in social science during the early
twentieth century).
136. See Kristoffersen, supra note 59, at 101.
137. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931,
945 (2000) (“In mainstream cost-benefit analysis, the primary work of valuation is done by
the use of willingness to pay.”). For other perspectives on the historical development of the
notion of welfare in economics, see L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 113-18
(1996); see also Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Subjective Well-Being, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1753,
1777-79 (2015) (reviewing BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15).
138. A typical example is the emergence of gross domestic product, which has become the
dominant measure of national well-being: the wealthier a nation, the more purchasing power
its citizens possess, thereby facilitating their ability to acquire the objects of their desire. But
see Ulen, supra note 137, at 1756-57 (noting international efforts to measure “gross national
happiness” to supplement the GDP metric).
139. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115, 115 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) (“[W]ork
within law and economics ... often (controversially) employs the normative criterion of
‘wealth maximization.’” (quoting Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economies, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979))); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
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Epstein, for example, claimed that “[w]hile the standard of wealth
is not the be all and end all of social welfare, it works especially well
with land use transactions, where market values are useful proxies
to social welfare.”140 Harold Demsetz similarly argued that societies
trend toward greater private ownership of resources, and that this
property-maximizing tendency is normatively attractive.141 Alexan-
der and Peñalver neatly summed up the elision of wealth-accretion
and welfare-maximization in much contemporary property scholar-
ship: “Because of the widespread tendency among property theorists
to use wealth as a proxy for utility (or welfare), this often amounts,
in effect, to an assertion that property institutions should be shaped
so as to maximize society’s net wealth.”142
The use of wealth—and, in the particular context of property,
land value—as a measure of welfare in utilitarian analysis is de-
rived from the law and economics model’s use of a “rational actor”
as its archetypal decision maker.143 Such an actor, in property acqui-
sitions, was assumed to seek the maximization of the value of her
land and chattels above all—a vision that Joe Singer called the
“investment” model of owners’ behavior.144 This assumption is par-
ticularly evident in legal scholarship about home acquisitions, which
often assumes that the dominant driver of residential property
purchases is the monetary value of the home.145 And while the
wealth-maximization model may operate solely in a descriptive
mode, it tends to be overtly or covertly deployed in a normative
manner as well, as scholars frequently argue that rational (wealth-
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) (discussing the prevalence of wealth-maximizing theories in law and
economics).
140. Richard A. Epstein, Essay, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property, 58
ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (2007).
141. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
142. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 17.
143. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 315 (2006).
144. See id. at 314-16 (contrasting this “investment” conception of property with “castle”
and “citizenship” models).
145. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4 (2001) (arguing that
homeowners purchase homes primarily as a financial investment).
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maximizing) decision makers make preferable (welfare-enhancing)
decisions.146
And both the positive law of property as well as cultural norms
assume that wealth accumulation will make individuals better off.
In the context of first possession, for example, extraction from the
commons is said to enhance individual welfare because the pos-
sessor gains property while no one loses anything.147 Similarly, rules
facilitating exchange of property, such as the rule against restraints
on alienation, are often said to generate individual welfare because
they produce wealth for both parties, because neither party would
have entered into the transaction if it did not improve her well-
being.148 And when private property is taken for public use, the
compensation due the landowner under the Just Compensation
Clause149 is based upon the highest and best use of that land—uni-
formly defined as the “most profitable use” to which the land could
be put.150 Each of these justifications relies on a proposition about
welfare that seems so obvious it need not be stated: the acquisition
of property makes those who get it better off.
The equation of wealth with well-being finds modern cultural
expression as well. Advertisers not-so-subtly equate status and
social esteem with the purchase of consumer goods—flossy purses,
expensive watches, and showy cars.151 And even outside the context
146. Harold Demsetz followed his 1967 descriptive account of the emergence of property
rights some years later with the normative claim that private owners’ wealth-maximizing
decisions are the optimal means of property allocation. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights II: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S653, S659-64 (2002); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
821, 826-27 (2009) (discussing the tendency of law and economics descriptive accounts of
property to morph into normative accounts).
147. So long, of course, as the Lockean proviso that no one is entitled to extract from the
commons unless they leave “enough and as good” for others is satisfied. See LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 134.
148. See Mark Glick, Is Monopoly Rent Seeking Compatible with Wealth Maximization?,
1994 BYU L. REV. 499, 506 (“Such private property rules are only efficient because (according
to the wealth maximization criterion) voluntary transactions are expected to yield wealth
gains to both individuals.”).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (“The highest and most
profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the
reasonably near future is to be considered.”).
151. See, e.g., Sabrina Lepine, Rolex, CONSUMER CULTURE FASHION (Mar. 20, 2012), https://
consumerculturefashion.wordpress.com/2012/03/20/rolex/ [https://perma.cc/7DEN-HFN2] (pro-
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of rampant consumerism, an underlying cultural norm equates the
good life with certain milestone purchases—a teenager’s first car, a
couple’s wedding rings, and, of course, the single-family home. No
one explicitly says, “Get more property and it will improve your life,”
but the implication is so clear that it need not be spelled out. 
The hedonics findings summarized in Part I undermine the
foundation of the wealth-maximization approach that animates
most utilitarian approaches to property. This normative framework
proposes that facilitating maximum acquisition of property is
normatively attractive, since as people acquire more wealth (and
therefore more welfare), they will be better off. Yet the evidence
from studies on subjective well-being shows just the opposite. Many
of these findings directly indict the presumption that wealth is a
plausible proxy for welfare, because increased wealth brings
surprisingly little happiness.152 And studies on property acquisition
specifically suggest that buying residential property—including
nicer, more expensive residential property—not only fails to bring
a sense of happiness, but may actually reduce it. Finally, a constel-
lation of other studies that target specific aspects of the relationship
between wealth accumulation and subjective well-being find that
property acquisition tends to reduce happiness by enabling status
comparisons, fomenting materialism, and keeping buyers on a
hedonic treadmill.
Of course, although wealth has become the primary welfare
criterion for economic-utilitarian approaches to property law, even
its expositors recognize that wealth is not necessarily the only way
to define welfare.153 Some leading scholars whose work falls square-
ly within the utilitarian law and economics tradition have explicitly
embraced a definition of welfare that captures more than just
wealth. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, for example, take a view
viding two examples of such advertisements).
152. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra Part I.A. Although there is some
evidence that increased income increases life satisfaction, the size of this effect is small,
especially at higher levels of income. But much weaker evidence demonstrates that wealth
brings higher moment-to-moment happiness, and any effect of increased income on affect
levels off once a household’s income reaches $75,000. See supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
153. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 743 (conceding that “wealth is not the be all and
end all of social welfare”). 
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of welfare that recasts concerns such as justice as a relevant factor
in a utilitarian calculus to the extent that actors’ satisfaction of
desires for fair outcomes are related to welfare.154 This approach is
simply preferentism,155 insofar as it assumes that what will enhance
an individual’s well-being is determined by what she desires, and
that a legal system that enhances the satisfaction of preferences is
optimal from a utilitarian standpoint.156 Yet this broader account of
welfare as desire-satisfaction largely ends up in the same place as
the dominant wealth-maximization approach to property for two
reasons. The first is its reliance on revealed preferences.157 If, as
many scholars in this vein believe, our decisions are the best
indicator of what makes us better off, then the fact that people
exhibit such a strong desire to acquire property—and have for
centuries—must be a meaningful indicator that doing so makes
them better off. If buying real and chattel property did not improve
our well-being, why on earth would we keep doing it? Second, more
property (and more wealth generally) may be regarded as a strong
proxy for well-being to the extent that it facilitates our ability to
154. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
988-89 (2001).
155. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 18 (“[E]conomic analysis generally
employs a single metric of value, which is itself defined in terms of individual experience (e.g.,
preference satisfaction).”).
156. See Mark C. Murphy, The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory, 33 NOÛS 247, 247 (1999)
(defining the “desire-fulfillment” theory as the notion that “an agent’s well-being is con-
stituted by the obtaining of states of affairs that are desired by that agent”). For a leading,
detailed defense of preference-satisfaction, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING
AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2012).
While preference-satisfaction remains the leading account of welfare, objective approaches
have recently attracted an increasing number of adherents. These theories define welfare not
according to whether individuals’ subjective preferences are realized, but instead by reference
to whether certain objective criteria that define the good life have been satisfied. A leading
such objective theory is Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach,” which defines well-being
as a state in which people have the ability to realize a threshold level of certain freedoms,
such as life, bodily health, practical reason, play, and control over one’s environment. See
generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 4-11 (2000).
157. The notion of “revealed preferences” optimistically assumes that what people choose
indicates the optimal outcome for them. See John Beshears et al., How Are Preferences
Revealed? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,976, 2008). Daniel
Haybron argued that this notion is central to Western liberal thought, which assumes that
“people are highly authoritative about their own well-being: while they sometimes make
mistakes, they pretty well know what’s good for them and how they are doing, and generally
make prudent choices in pursuit of their interests.” HAYBRON, supra note 14, at 13.
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satisfy our preferences by acquiring the objects of our desire.158
Wealthier people are obviously in a better position to get the
things—at least the material things—they want. So if one takes the
commonly held preferentist position that the best criterion for well-
being is honoring and enabling the satisfaction of individual wants,
then constructing property law to facilitate as much individual
acquisition of land and personalty as possible makes sense as a
means of maximizing individual well-being. This is not because
wealth accumulation is a good unto itself,159 but rather because
wealth is a primary means of realizing one’s preferences, which in
turn will generate individual well-being.
Scholars who embrace this view might thus argue that refuting
economic-utilitarian approaches to property by invoking hedonics
evidence simply misses the point. On this view, preference-satisfac-
tion is a superior criterion of welfare, so that law should respond to
people’s desire to acquire more property regardless of what evidence
shows about the subjective happiness it does (or, more aptly, does
not) produce. This response needs to be taken seriously. Preferent-
ism, of which economic-utilitarian theories of property are a variant,
remains the leading standard for welfare in the philosophical and
social science literature.160
Yet subjective measures of well-being provide a much better
metric for welfare than desire-satisfaction for a pair of reasons.
First, hedonics supplies a direct measure of the very thing for which
preference-satisfaction is only an imperfect proxy: subjective well-
being itself.161 Andrew J. Oswald made this point convincingly:
158. This point is really true of only one form of property: cash money, which (if you have
enough of it) immediately lets you buy things that satisfy your preferences. This is not true
of real or chattel property, which is not readily convertible into or tradeable for the objects of
one’s desire.
159. Some scholars have made this claim. Early in his career, Richard Posner took the
position (which he has since recanted) that wealth maximization should be law’s guiding
normative criterion. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). In
so doing, he explicitly distinguished Bentham’s Greatest Happiness principle and the notion
of subjective well-being generally as an indulgent and unproductive standard for welfare. See
id. at 83 n.62 (“The man who leads a contemplative, withdrawn rural life may be happier than
the captain of industry, but he will also produce a smaller surplus for the rest of society to
enjoy.”).
160. See HAYBRON, supra note 14, at 34 (observing that in both law and philosophy,
preference-satisfaction remains “the theory to beat”).
161. Preferentists might respond to this view by arguing that preference-satisfaction, not
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The relevance of economic performance is that it may be a
means to an end. That end is not the consumption of beefburg-
ers, nor the accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing
of some high level of interest rates, but rather the enrichment of
mankind’s feeling of well-being. Economic things matter only in
so far as they make people happier.162
So it may be the case that individuals with resources and freedom
make welfare-maximizing decisions, but why focus on these distal
factors if we can directly answer the question whether individuals’
choices actually caused them to have greater or lesser happiness?163
Of course, if the preferentists are right that people tend to make
welfare-maximizing decisions, then the two theories are simply
different means of getting to the same outcome. But—and this is the
second point—a mountain of economic and psychological research
from the past several decades has shown conclusively that getting
what we sincerely believe we want does not always actually make
subjective well-being, is well-being itself. See, e.g., Connie S. Rosati, Persons, Perspectives, and
Full Information Accounts of the Good, 105 ETHICS 296, 296-97 (1995). But this view runs
counter to basic intuitions about what it means to be better off. If I choose to eat a burger
because I sincerely believe it will be delicious, but in fact it is poisoned with E. coli and makes
me terribly sick, then the preferentist view would imply that eating the burger has made me
better off even though I am wracked with nausea. Preferentists have countered this objection
by arguing that the only preferences that count in a welfare calculus are the ideal preferences
that an actor would have if they had full information. See id. at 297. This move founders on
the practical reality that people lack such information. This laundered-preferences view is
entirely academic because it assumes some imaginary version of the self who can accurately
predict all future states of being. See BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 140; David Sobel,
Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 794 (1994). It is also widely
regarded as circular, essentially reducible to the tautology that well-being is constituted of
preferences for well-being. See SUMNER, supra note 137, at 135.
162. Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815, 1815
(1997).
163. A variation on the preferentist theory avers that even the satisfaction of preferences
that do not result in increases in subjective well-being make up our well-being. So, for
example, on this view of preferentism, one would argue that it enhances an environmentalist’s
welfare that an obscure species of squirrel located in Sri Lanka escapes extinction, even if this
environmentalist remains unaware of this event. By contrast, scholars who favor happiness
as the standard for well-being insist that unless the environmentalist knows of the squirrel’s
survival—in which case it would translate into subjective well-being—then it cannot be part
of the welfare calculus. Compare MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 34 (2006) (making the preferentist argument on behalf of
unknown species extinction), with Bronsteen et al., supra note 51, at 1619-21 (engaging and
rejecting this argument). 
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us better off.164 Indeed, a major project of the hedonics literature has
been to identify the various cognitive biases that compromise our
ability to engage in accurate affective forecasting.165 Part I provided
an extended, property-specific illustration of this point. People tend
to want to acquire as much property as possible, but when they do,
the happiness they expect from ownership fails to materialize, and
in fact their subjective well-being is often reduced (or at least not
improved) by getting the thing they so desperately wanted.
Contemporary utilitarian defenses of property, most of which use
wealth as their primary criterion for welfare, predominate.166 Yet ex-
positors of these theories typically fail to articulate just what kind
of welfare property should maximize. The foregoing analysis showed
that the leading economic-utilitarian accounts of property implicitly
adopt a preference-satisfaction approach to welfare. They favor
widespread acquisition of property both because it is rooted in
owners’ own preferences, and because wealth makes it easier for
people to get what they want. Research on happiness and property,
though, casts doubt on this preferentist model of ownership and
welfare. Preference-satisfaction is merely a behavioral proxy for
subjective well-being, which studies show ownership does not en-
hance. Moreover, the hedonics literature undermines the founda-
tional assumption of preferentism that people getting what they
want will enhance their subjective well-being by showing that
164. Gilbert and Wilson call this phenomenon “miswanting.” Gilbert & Wilson, supra note
12, at 551. The shortfall between what we think we want and the happiness that we actually
feel once we get it may be due to misunderstanding the object of our desire; using the wrong
theory for determining what we want; or confusing an affective state with our actual desires.
See id. at 551-54.
In fact, many people may even have self-harming preferences—consider a depressed person
who prefers to stay inside and sulk even though going out in the sun will make him feel
better—which further undermines the preferentist account of welfare. See Richard Kraut,
Desire and the Human Good, PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N, Nov. 1994, at 39, 40-41
(discussing the problem of self-harming preferences).
165. See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006) (cataloguing
numerous studies that demonstrate our inability to engage in accurate affective forecasting
regarding our own well-being).
166. One qualification is in order before moving on from this discussion. The analysis in
this Part—and throughout the Article—largely assumes that the purchasers of property are
human individuals, as opposed to corporations or other entities. The hedonics analysis may
play out differently with respect to the latter, so I pause here to emphasize that this Article
is focused on individual, not corporate, property acquisition. Thanks to Jonathan Masur for
pointing out this distinction.
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people tend to be terrible predictors of their own future happiness.
Finally, even if one takes the preferentist position that achieving
desires is the best measure of welfare, subjective well-being still
remains relevant, if not entirely constitutive of, the overall welfare
calculus. Indeed, preferentists regularly concede as much.167
2. Personhood
Next, consider property and personhood. In a pathbreaking arti-
cle, Margaret Radin argued that “to achieve proper self-develop-
ment—to be a person—an individual needs some control over
resources in the external environment.”168 Her claim distinguished
property that is closely tied to personal identity (for example, a
family home or a precious heirloom) from other purely fungible
property (for example, a dollar bill or a share of stock).169 While
contemporary property scholarship most commonly associates this
personhood perspective with Radin’s work, this notion has deep
roots. Georg Hegel crafted a theory of property that reflected the
need for the abstract notion of free will to be made tangible in some
external object in order to be fully realized.170 For Hegel, property
was the necessary medium through which individuals realized both
their personal and social development.171 Radin, inspired by this
classical natural rights tradition,172 similarly argued that property
167. See, e.g., BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 133 n.1 (citing numerous leading
philosophers all conceding that subjective well-being is highly relevant to, if not constitutive
of, welfare); Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 391, 391 (2005) (“Philosophers have disagreed about the place of human welfare in
judgments about public policies generally and their distributive outcomes in particular. But
virtually all agree that welfare effects should play some role.”).
168. Radin, supra note 11, at 957.
169. See id. at 959 (“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of
themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the
way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world. They may be as
different as people are different, but some common examples might be a wedding ring, a
portrait, an heirloom, or a house.”).
170. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 41 (T.M.
Knox trans., 1952) (1821) (“A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in
order to exist as Idea.”).
171. See id. paras. 44-46; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 355
(1988) (commenting on this aspect of Hegel’s personality view of property).
172. See Radin, supra note 11, at 971-78 (discussing Hegelian property theory as the basis
for her personhood account).
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that belonged to the former category was essential to one’s self-
definition and self-development and concluded that “the personhood
perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”173
Radin’s personhood account carried several substantive implica-
tions for property law. For example, favoring personhood as a value
should make the state loath to displace people from their residences,
counseling limitation of the eminent domain power174 or passage of
renter-protective doctrines such as the implied warranty of habit-
ability.175 Radin also suggested that the personhood theory sup-
ported welfare rights, albeit only insofar as it would “suggest that
government should rearrange property rights so that fungible prop-
erty of some people does not overwhelm the opportunities of the rest
to constitute themselves in property.”176
The personhood theory of property has been enormously influen-
tial,177 leading a generation of scholars to develop arguments in
favor of ownership rights for things—homes, heirlooms, the body—
that are thought to be constitutive of the self.178 This theory has
been embraced as a less calculating approach to property than
economic-utilitarian approaches, which tend to elide differences
between kinds of property, reducing them to nothing more than
their market value.179 The empirical foundations of these theo-
ries—in both Hegel’s and Radin’s formulation—regarding the
psychological importance of certain kinds of property, though, were
not accompanied by any empirical evidentiary support. The new
research on hedonic psychology tends to cast doubt on several
173. Id. at 986.
174. See id. at 1005 (“[I]f the personhood perspective is expressed in law, one might expect
to find an implied limitation on the eminent domain power.”).
175. See id. at 995-96.
176. Id. at 990.
177. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2009) (“Personhood theory infused a generation of scholarship,
engraining the notion that homes are special objects deeply intertwined with psychological
functioning.”).
178. See id.; see also Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549, 582-94
(2013).
179. Along these lines, Radin followed her work on personhood with another highly
influential piece that questioned whether certain objects should ever be reduced to the status
of objects in trade. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1897-98 (1987).
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foundational premises of the property and personhood perspec-
tive.180
First, in the years since Radin articulated her variation on the
personhood account, psychologists have (for unrelated reasons)
asked whether property, including even property that individuals
highly prize, is a necessary constituent of their sense of identity.
The short answer: it is not. A number of studies found that while
property, such as a beloved family heirloom or a residential home,
may serve as a way for people to express their identity, it is not an
exclusive or even important means of doing so.181 Study subjects who
lacked the kind of property Radin claimed was instrumental to
personhood reported no worse senses of self than those who
possessed such land or goods; they simply reported expressing their
personal identities in other ways, such as via personal relationships
or life goals.182 And hedonics scholars have recently shown that
goods are only weakly constitutive of people’s sense of identity,
especially compared to experiences, which individuals are much
more likely to associate with their essential selves.183 As Stephanie
Stern argued, the personhood theory wrongly conflates “the notion
that certain objects, such as homes, express and even help maintain
our identities and the theory that objects actually construct our
180. For a detailed and wide-ranging critique of Radin’s personhood theory rooted in
empirical research that includes but is not limited to hedonics, see generally Stern, supra note
177, at 1134-35.
181. See, e.g., Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 47 J. PSYCHOLOGY 13,
14-23 (1959) (finding that possessions did not fall particularly high on a list of items that
survey subjects were asked to rate as “definitely a part of your own self”); Marsha L. Richins,
Valuing Things: The Public and Private Meanings of Possessions, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 504,
508-09, 512 (1994) (finding, based on a survey of 500 households, that people regarded homes
as necessities rather than symbolic possessions representing the self); see also Stern, supra
note 177, at 1110-15 (citing numerous studies critiquing Radin’s property and personhood
theory).
182. Cf. Shigehiro Oishi et al., Residential Mobility, Self-Concept, and Positive Affect in
Social Interactions, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131, 134 (2007).
183. See generally Travis J. Carter & Thomas Gilovich, I Am What I Do, Not What I Have:
The Differential Centrality of Experiential and Material Purchases to the Self, 102 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1304, 1304, 1313, 1315 (2012) (showing that goods are only
weakly constitutive of identity as compared to experiences because (1) when asked about
themselves, individuals identified experiences not things as more self-constitutive, (2) study
subjects were more likely to mention experiences in telling their life stories, (3) subjects
reported that experiential purchases were a more reliable indicator of who someone else is,
and (4) subjects seemed to cling more to cherished experiential memories than to memories
of things).
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identities in a prerequisite sense.”184 Indeed, one of the reasons that
happiness scholars have found that experiences produce more
subjective well-being than material goods is that people regard
experiences they have as part of their true identity, while goods are
regarded as external to the self as separate objects that are subject
to trade.185
These findings about the relationship between property and iden-
tity are broadly related to hedonics in that they investigate how, if
at all, possessions make us better off. But the more specific findings
about property and happiness detailed in Part I further undermine,
or at least complicate, the empirical premises of the personhood
perspective. One implication of this research is that if property ac-
quisition does generate a sense of self, it is not necessarily a positive
or constructive one.186 Acquisition, especially of positional goods like
homes or luxury items, often fosters a sense of competition and
materialism that causes one’s sense of worth to be wrapped up in
the things she owns and tied to constant comparisons to others’
possessions.187 Eastern thinkers have espoused a theory directly
contrary to Radin’s and especially Hegel’s, suggesting that it is only
when we divest ourselves of attachments to the outside world—and
in particular to possessions—that we can truly know ourselves.188
Indeed, numerous recent studies show that those who divest them-
selves of goods—especially through charitable donation—report
184. Stern, supra note 177, at 1112.
185. See LYUBOMIRSKY, supra note 80, at 152-54 (describing and citing studies indicating
“that it is experiences—not things—that make us happy”); Carter & Gilovich, supra note 183,
at 1312-13 (reporting results of studies confirming this conclusion).
186. Radin does note the possibility that some property relationships may work “to hinder
rather than to support healthy self-constitution,” and describes unhealthy attachment to
things as a form of “fetishism.” See Radin, supra note 11, at 969; see also id. at 982 n.86. While
Radin acknowledges this concern in the abstract, she does not give any sense of how one
might distinguish healthy from unhappy attachment to possessions, and in any event work
done since Radin’s article has shown that ownership tends to degrade more than to support
identity. See, e.g., Monika A. Bauer et al., Cuing Consumerism: Situational Materialism
Undermines Personal and Social Well-Being, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 517, 517 (2012).
187. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 46-50 (discussing the tendency of acquisition to foment
materialism); Brown et al., supra note 8, at 2288-89 (reporting that a materialistic mindset
is strongly associated with lower subjective well-being).
188. For example, Thich Nhat Hanh wrote, “Letting go gives us freedom, and freedom is
the only condition for happiness. If, in our heart, we still cling to anything—anger, anxiety,
or possessions—we cannot be free.” THICH NHAT HANH, THE HEART OF THE BUDDHA’S
TEACHING 78 (Broadway 1999).
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higher incidence of personal well-being.189 These findings are
consistent with other evidence suggesting that purchases of homes
or luxury goods may even alienate owners from the kinds of
constructive sources of identity that lead to a healthy sense of self. 
3. Property and (Negative) Liberty
Consider a second alternative defense of property: the libertarian-
influenced claim that ownership uniquely enables individual
autonomy.190 While there are numerous property theories rooted in
some notion of freedom,191 this Subsection will focus on two it-
erations of property as negative liberty,192 both of which share a
common theme that Eduardo Peñalver has termed “exit.”193 The first
is that owning property provides a space for securing the exercise of
private freedom that lies in contrast to (and is threatened by)
collectivities such as the ever-encroaching welfare state.194 The
second variation regards property as a means of withdrawal from
the surrounding community, securing autonomy from private rather
than public demands.195 In both of these views, owning private
property is a precondition for freedom insofar as it provides both the
literal and figurative walls that allow individuals to cordon them-
selves off from interference by or interaction with private and public
entities.196 Autonomy-based defenses of property come in welfarist
189. See Aknin et al., supra note 126, at 646.
190. See Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1891.
191. Hegel’s personhood account, for example, was ultimately concerned with freedom
insofar as he argued that property enabled individuals to develop their free will through its
manifestation in external objects. See HEGEL, supra note 170, para. 30 (calling individual free
will manifested in property “the embodiment of ... self-conscious freedom”).
192. These accounts lie in contrast to other property theories (including those rooted in
virtue and discussed in more detail infra Part II.A.4) that express concern for positive lib-
erty—that is, affirmative entitlements. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, The
Human Right to Private Property 5-6 (Dec. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2624428 [https://perma.cc/6CKC-DP2X] (arguing that a private property regime
must “secure[] the possibility of developing [one’s] own life-plans” (footnote omitted)).
193. Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1890-91.
194. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 161 (1999); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER,
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 40 (2003).
195. See Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1891-92 (“[A] person’s ability to retreat into his
privately owned space enhances and protects his liberty by providing him with the power to
disregard the demands of his fellow citizens.”).
196. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 133 (1960); JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
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and nonwelfarist varieties. Some scholars have argued that the
autonomy enabled by private property is a good unto itself;197 others
have stressed that this form of autonomy generates socially desir-
able outcomes such as wealth creation and self-determination.198
This theoretical disposition in favor of autonomy as a central organ-
izing principle for property translates into substantive preferences
for very strong owners’ rights, in particular the right to exclude.199
An autonomy-inspired theory of property would thus celebrate cases
that uphold owners’ rights to make private agreements keeping out
undesirable residents.200 By contrast, it would excoriate judicial
decisions that limit landowners’ rights in favor of providing social
services to tenants201 or enabling access to public property.202
Although the two variants of the autonomy account of property
each have different explanations for how it does so, both concur
on a necessary, central factual proposition: private property in-
creases individual freedom. Yet the research on happiness and prop-
erty calls this shared empirical presumption into doubt, showing
that acquisition—and in particular, homeownership203—may do
more to reduce than enhance autonomy. In fact, the surprisingly low
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 272 (1990).
197. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171 (1974).
198. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 30-31 (1997) (arguing that
private property ownership enables self-determination).
199. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1841-50 (2006) (discussing examples of strong variations on the right to
exclude).
200. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (upholding restrictive covenant barring sex offenders with high
likelihood of recidivism from living in residential community).
201. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971) (rejecting trespass claim
brought against aid workers who sought to deliver health care services to the landowner’s
migrant employees).
202. See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124
(N.J. 2005) (holding that resident had a right to cross private land to access public beach in
the absence of a public access road).
203. The iconic type of property that is said to enhance individual liberty is the residential
home, which is cast as a fortress of private autonomy in the law’s “castle doctrine,” see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2016) (allowing an occupant of a home to use or threaten “force,
including deadly force” without any duty to retreat because the law creates a presumption
that entry by a person other than a lawful occupant is “with the intent to commit an unlawful
act involving force or violence”), and lauded as a space within which private citizens can
retreat from the state and each other by theorists, see Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1897 (noting
that “proponents of property as exit” are concerned about, inter alia, “the freedom of the
property owner to do what he wants in the private confines of his own home”).
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happiness reported by contemporary American property owners can
be traced in part to the decreased freedom wrought by acquisition
of land and chattels beyond a subsistence threshold.204 This operates
on two levels: first, property may cause owners to have less physical
and economic freedom of action; and second, it may also contribute
to owners subjectively feeling less free. And to the extent that some
scholars argue that autonomy is an instrumental good in that it
facilitates other worthy ends,205 happiness research casts doubt on
this welfarist iteration of the theory as well. 
To begin, the possession of property may limit physical and
economic freedom because it undermines our ability to do, or to
afford to do, other things. One of the reasons that purchasing
property, especially residential property, has been shown to reduce
subjective well-being is that it constrains mobility, thereby limiting
one’s physical freedom.206 Homeowners, in contrast to renters, are
less free to pick up and move both because they tend to invest more
in their homes and because the cumbersome and fickle sales process
hampers relocation.207 This lack of mobility manifests itself in a
number of negative ways in the lives of homeowners, from prevent-
ing them from taking advantage of the opportunities presented by
life in a different area208 to making it more difficult to exit a neigh-
borhood that has become unsafe.209 The lack of physical freedom
204. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 48-49.
205. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 198, at 30-31.
206. See Stern, supra note 177, at 1105 (cataloguing the negative effects of homeownership
on the freedom to relocate).
207. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 31 (2009). Indeed, many homeowners during the subprime
mortgage crisis found themselves unable to sell because they lacked the liquidity to pay the
difference between the amount of their mortgage and the value of their home. See id.
208. This reduced mobility may actually decrease states’ responsiveness to individual
objections to policies. The process of Tiebout sorting assumes that when states pass laws to
which people object, voters will move to register their displeasure. See Charles M. Tiebout,
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). An electorate that
finds it less easy to move will thus find it harder to show their opinion of state policies
through relocation. See id.
209. See Richard Florida, Why People Stay Where They Are, CITYLAB (Sept. 22, 2014), http://
www.citylab.com/housing/2014/09/why-people-stay-where-they-are/380583/ [https://perma.
cc/G6QT-RKA9]. This lack of mobility tends to work to the detriment of lower-income home-
owners, many of whom found themselves unable to escape deteriorating neighborhoods during
the fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis because all their capital was invested in their
(significantly less valuable) homes.
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that may be imposed by a home purchase itself tends to suppress
subjective well-being.210 But large-scale purchases of land or costly
chattels that require financing may degrade one’s sense of freedom
for a different reason: the crushing debt loads that such purchases
typically entail tend to substantially reduce happiness. Those who
are burdened with jumbo mortgages or other debt are necessarily
less free to afford to do much else, including engaging in the kinds
of experiential activities that may do far more than possessions to
increase subjective well-being.211 
Second, while scholars have argued that property ownership pro-
duces a subjective feeling of liberation from external constraints,212
the happiness literature suggests that just the opposite is often true.
This may be true of any leveraged acquisition, because the mental
burdens that come with massive debt likely undermine any such
subjective sense of autonomy.213 Moreover, studies on the happiness
effects of materialist mindsets suggest that acquisition often causes
us to feel less rather than more free.214 Purchases of homes and
luxury goods in particular tend to draw people into positional com-
parisons with other consumers, causing them to feel obligated to
continue purchasing more and better things both to compete with
their peers and to keep the fleeting psychological lift such purchases
bring.215 Beyond a subsistence threshold, then, property may reduce
owners’ subjective freedom both because it makes them feel internal
psychological pressure to continue consuming in order to stay on the
“hedonic treadmill” and because it enmeshes them in pernicious
social competitions with peers.216
210. See Stern, supra note 177, at 1105.
211. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 68, 95 (describing the debt/experience
tradeoff).
212. Cf. Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1899 (“Property as exit leans heavily on the beneficial
effects for individual liberty of the mere possibility of exit.”).
213. See LYUBOMIRSKY, supra note 80, at 151 (discussing the psychological burdens of being
“house-poor”). While most of the discussion in the literature relates to mortgage debt, these
mental costs logically apply just as well to massive debt incurred to finance the purchase of
any costly consumer goods.
214. Cf. Brown et al., supra note 8, at 2288-89 (showing that materialism tends to make
people less happy, especially when they acquire goods).
215. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 49; see also supra notes 103-04 (discussing positional
goods).
216. See LAYARD, supra note 21, at 48 (explaining that increased material acquisition
can lead to a compulsion to keep consuming in order to achieve the diminishing marginal
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The foregoing points cast doubt on the central factual assertion
underlying the autonomy-based defense of property: that owning
more things actually does make us freer. But the happiness
literature also undermines an additional aspect of this defense, the
consequentialist variant that autonomy is normatively attractive
because it leads to welfare-enhancing outcomes. This iteration of the
autonomy theory of property asserts that freedom is good because
if left to our own devices, we will make decisions that tend to
maximize our well-being. Yet as the previous Subsection’s critique
of economic-utilitarian defenses of property has already elaborated,
merely giving people a greater capacity to choose does not always
translate into choices that enhance subjective well-being. The
surprisingly weak relationship between getting what we want and
being happier may be the major contribution of the happiness
literature to date. But autonomy may lie in tension with our well-
being for another reason. Writers who have espoused the upside of
property as a means of exit from neighbors and state actors who
constrain our freedom assume that this kind of isolated self-
determination will necessarily bring an individual the most well-
being.217 Hedonic psychology has cast doubt on this premise, too,
suggesting that we are not at our happiest when we are safely
ensconced in our own house among our own possessions, but when
we are enmeshed in relationships with others who need and may
impose on us, and even—heaven forbid—limit our property rights.
Thus, an apartment dweller who enjoys a broad social network with
his neighbors may be happier than a magnate like Citizen Kane,
who lives in spectacular opulence all alone.
4. Progressive Property
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the libertarian account
of property as a shield from the state and social relationships is a
relatively new school of thought that can be loosely grouped under
the umbrella of progressive approaches to property.218 While
psychological benefits of consumption).
217. See Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1891-92 (discussing the notion of property as an exit,
whereby “a person’s ability to retreat into his privately owned space enhances and protects
his liberty by providing him with the power to disregard the demands of his fellow citizens”).
218. See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
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property as exit suggests that the virtue of property is that it allows
individuals to defend themselves from public and private obliga-
tions, a common thread running through progressive property is the
inevitability of community and the necessity of crafting a normative
vision of ownership that acknowledges and enhances social relation-
ships. Carol Rose espoused an early version of this perspective in
her work noting the capacity of public property—roads, parks, town
squares—to bring people together not only for the purpose of
wealth-enhancing commerce, but also to foster a richer sense of
community and civility.219 Some decades later, the notion that
property inextricably links owners together in a web of shared social
context has ripened into a variety of related normative theories.
While very different in their particulars, each of these normative
theories rejects the proposition that economics-inflected utilitarian-
ism should be the sole guiding criterion for property law, espouses
a more limited vision of owners’ rights, and argues that property
holders bear some obligation to their communities by virtue of their
status as owners.220 
These theories, espoused in subtly different ways by several
scholars, stress the extent to which ownership entails obligations to
nonowners.221 Peter Gerhart, for example, regards the essence of
property law as “respond[ing] to the question of what we owe each
other.”222 One justification for these obligations is simply contractar-
ian. The state extends property owners many privileges, from theft
protections to public roads that ensure access to their land, so a
REV. 743, 743-44 (2009) (enumerating the principles of the progressive approach to property
as shared by its main expositors).
219. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774-81 (1986) (discussing public property as a
socializing and civilizing institution that can foster connections among local community
members as well as far-flung people).
220. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746-51 (2009); Peñalver, supra note 146, at 823-26; Joseph
William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1061-62 (2009).
221. See PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY, at x-xi (2014) (outlining
a vision in which property law fosters social networks by creating obligations between indi-
viduals); Alexander, supra note 220, at 753-60; Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 192, at 17-18.
222. GERHART, supra note 221, at 5; see also id. at 6 (“[T]he responsibility of an individual
for the well-being of others is nonetheless the key to understanding the scope of property
rights.”).
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simple notion of equity suggests that owners thus owe the state an
obligation to contribute their own fair share to the common good.223
But another increasingly invoked basis for the substantive commit-
ment to owners’ obligations to nonowners lies in the tradition of
Aristotelian virtue theory. This theory is welfarist in that it is
concerned about the consequences of property law for human
welfare, but it is starkly different than the utilitarian approach
because it does not determine welfare by reference to sum-ranking
of subjective mental states or satisfaction of individual prefer-
ences.224 Rather, it is an objectivist theory that assumes that there
is an ideal, virtuous existence that all humans should aspire to
live.225 Increasing the likelihood that we will act virtuously, though,
requires that all people have access to resources that give them the
capability to live a good life. Aristotelian virtue theory thus favors
limiting property owners’ rights to the extent that such limits are
necessary to enable human flourishing throughout society.226
As its expositors have conceded, the notion of virtue does not
cleanly translate into normative recommendations for substantive
law.227 As a general matter, though, such an approach would make
it incumbent on owners to contribute to the communities to which
they belong in order to sustain the social matrices that enable all
people to flourish.228 At a high level of generality, this would mean
favoring a more communal approach to the right to use property, a
resistance to the fungibility of all land and chattels, and an attitude
of cautious humility toward land use decisions. Several of the
leading cases in property law illustrate how such an approach would
play out. For example, a virtue theorist would embrace judicial
223. See Alexander, supra note 220, at 758-60.
224. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 87-97 (casting virtue-based theories
of property as welfarist).
225. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have developed a capabilities approach that
fleshes out the idea of human flourishing by reference to certain capacities that should be
preserved for all people to allow them to increase their well-being. See NUSSBAUM, supra note
156, at 86-88; see also AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999).
226. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 87-97 (discussing how Aristotelian
virtue theory translates into a substantive vision of property law); Peñalver, supra note 146,
at 860-74 (developing a virtue theory of land use).
227. See Peñalver, supra note 146, at 874-76 (discussing the problem of virtue and
indeterminacy in the property context). Peñalver claims, though, that “on the determinacy
front ... virtue theory does no worse than utilitarianism and its cousins.” Id. at 876.
228. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 129, at 95.
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decisions like State v. Shack, which limited landowners’ rights to
exclude in order to enable renters’ access to social services,229 or
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., which
imposed easements on private land in order to assure access to
coastal land dedicated to public use.230 On the other hand, a virtue
theorist may more skeptically regard other decisions, such as
Mulligan v. Panther Valley, which permitted a homeowners asso-
ciation to bar undesirable residents from their community.231
The progressive approach to property is primarily a normative
one, but it depends at least in part on certain descriptive claims
about how property operates in the world, and in particular how
acquisition affects owners themselves. The ensuing discussion
highlights two ways that hedonics research on property and subjec-
tive well-being casts doubt on two of progressive property’s central
factual propositions. First, a central theme of this literature is that
the acquisition of property tends to facilitate individual develop-
ment of virtue.232 This is in one sense an intuitive claim; people who
have more resources and own more property have more freedom and
capability to live a good life. Aristotle himself made this argument,
claiming that the acquisition of property spurred owners to develop
virtues like generosity and moderation.233 But the hedonics litera-
ture belies this intuition in a number of ways, suggesting that the
relationship between property and individual virtue is not nearly as
sunny as virtue theory assumes.
One of the major findings of the hedonics literature, as discussed
in Part I, is that property owners may have lower than expected
subjective well-being. A major reason for this, borne out by studies
of the psychological effects of ownership, is that acquisition does
not necessarily lead people to develop other-oriented virtues, but
229. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971); see also Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW
127, 149-54 (2009) (discussing how Shack is consistent with a virtue-based theory of property).
230. See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124
(N.J. 2005).
231. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192-93 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (reversing lower court’s judgment upholding the ban, though
ultimately resting that decision on the basis of an insufficient record to determine the issue).
232. See Peñalver, supra note 146, at 876-86 (discussing virtue theory of land use).
233. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 62-63 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1923) (c.
350 B.C.E.).
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instead may cause them to focus exclusively on their own household
and possessions. For example, the homeowners surveyed in one
study reported that they spent less time with friends and neighbors
and exhibited more negative affect during those interactions than
similarly situated renters.234 And the hedonic psychology findings on
materialism further cast doubt on the relationship between ac-
quisition and individual virtues like generosity and moderation.
Contrary to Aristotle, these studies suggest that acquisition may
make people more focused on what they own rather than the
concerns of other people. Nor is the tension between ownership and
high-mindedness limited to homeownership. Buying luxury goods
also tends to make people more selfish than virtuous by tempting
them to focus on material acquisition and social status, and to
regard their neighbors and acquaintances as rivals in positional
competitions. This latter point dovetails with the finding that a
major reason that property makes people less happy is that people
quickly adapt to its presence, leading them to buy more and more of
it to create the same buzz of joy, which is pretty much the opposite
of the Aristotelian notion of moderation.
Second, much of the progressive scholarship on property relies on
the related proposition that ownership of private property builds
social bonds in a constructive way—in other words, that property
acquisition is constitutive of communities.235 Eduardo Peñalver, for
example, argued that property is not principally “a boundary
separating individuals from one another but rather ... a means of
joining individuals to each other in community.”236 This notion, too,
traces to Aristotle, who claimed that property tended to cause
owners to invest more deeply in their communities by incentivizing
them to take better care of what they owned, and to give back to
others through the virtue of generosity.237 And while this is an
appealing story, empirical work on happiness and property suggests
234. See Bucchianeri, supra note 46, at 18.
235. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 1019
(2005) (book review) (“Property is one of the most sociable institutions that human beings
have created, depending as it does on mutual forbearance and on the recognition of and
respect for the claims of others.”).
236. Peñalver, supra note 11, at 1894.
237. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 233, at 62.
2017] BUYING HAPPINESS 1903
that the relationship between acquisition and community is much
more ambivalent than progressive property theorists have asserted.
As the foregoing discussion indicated, the hedonics studies have
found that acquiring property does not necessarily make owners
better people and may even make them more selfish and materialis-
tic. This in turn undermines the assumption of the progressive
property literature that acquisition produces “virtue” and owners
will invest more deeply in their communities. And certain particular
findings by hedonics scholars about the happiness effects of property
seem to bear this out. For example, Bucchianeri’s study showed that
owners tend to be more isolated than similarly situated renters.238
Similarly, research has suggested that social bonds among home-
owners, especially in neighborhoods of single-family homes, tend to
be weak or even nonexistent—an unsurprising implication of living
in much lower-density settings where relocation is increasingly
frequent.239 The very notion of the modern neighborhood as the basis
for one’s social network is no longer as relevant as it was in the
twentieth century now that people tend to look to their workplaces
and online settings to create a sense of belonging.240 Relatedly, a
study of voting patterns among owners and renters indicated that
homeowners vote at only a somewhat higher rate than renters,
further disrupting the myth that holding title leads people to exhibit
a sense of civitas for their community.241 And much the same goes
238. See Bucchianeri, supra note 46, at 18-19.
239. See Stern, supra note 177, at 1121-22. By contrast, social bonds in higher-density
settings such as apartment buildings or condominium complexes tend to be stronger, sug-
gesting that the relationship between residence and social network is unrelated to ownership
status. See id. at 1093, 1121-22.
240. See id. at 1122-24, 1122 n.187. Robert Putnam identified this trend away from
neighborhood-based communities well over a decade ago. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 25-28 (2000). Critics of
Putnam’s work have argued that the American community has not declined; instead, it has
merely relocated to online settings and nonresidential community groups, which, if true,
remains consistent with the proposition that becoming a homeowner does not necessarily
produce a sense of community. See Stern, supra note 177, at 1126 (mentioning the Internet
as a way other than homeownership to increase local social capital).
241. See Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 362, 373-74 (1999) (showing that
differentials between owners and renters in terms of civic participation decrease substantially
after controlling for length of occupancy); cf. Stern, supra note 177, at 1125 (noting that the
best evidence for the thesis shows that homeowners are only marginally more civically
engaged than renters).
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for luxury goods like fancy cars and electronics, whose tendency to
foment materialism and positional comparison are more likely to
drive neighbors apart than instill in them a sense of classical virtue. 
Of course, the new progressive property theory does not depend
entirely on the descriptive claim that property makes people more
social. Rather, it advances the normative claim that property
owners have a responsibility to act virtuously toward one another
and to nonowners.242 Although the fraught relationship between
property, community, virtue, and subjective well-being does not
entirely undermine (or even engage) this prescriptive claim, it does
complicate it. It is more plausible to encourage a virtue-centered
theory of property if acquisition itself foments virtue. And it is
certainly more workable to claim that owners have affirmative,
other-oriented obligations if ownership itself fosters richer commu-
nity relations. Peñalver’s embrace of a virtue-based approach to
property, for example, is premised in part on the factual assertion
that “ownership of property in a particular community creates and
reinforces social ties among neighbors, the maintenance of which
provides owners with market-independent reasons for acting.”243
But happiness studies on the effect of increased ownership on social
relationships suggest that this premise is more complicated.244
Acquiring property—including, but not limited to, residential
homes—may make owners more selfish rather than more other-
regarding and weaken rather than strengthen social bonds. This is
especially true in an age when property is explicitly equated with
happiness and status, and when people form communities online
and relocate with increasing frequency.245 And while this does not
fully indict the theoretical appeal of progressive property, it does
pose a practical challenge that its defenders will have to address if
they want their theories to have practical purchase.
242. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 220, at 747-48 (“Property rights are inherently
relational; because of this characteristic, owners necessarily owe obligations to others.”
(footnote omitted)). See generally GERHART, supra note 221 (espousing a view of property
under which owners have affirmative obligations of moral conduct toward each other and
toward nonowners).
243. Peñalver, supra note 146, at 838.
244. That research, of course, relates exclusively to private property, so it does not have
anything to say about arguments that public property produces social benefits in the form of
a richer or more humane society.
245. See Stern, supra note 177, at 1121-22.
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B. Toward a Happiness Theory of Property
The foregoing Subsection explored the negative proposition that
the findings of the hedonics literature undermine central premises
of the leading normative theories of property. This Subsection
(briefly) considers a corollary question: can happiness supply a
superior normative theory of property? The answer this Article
sketches below is a carefully qualified yes. To the extent that
policymakers are concerned about crafting property law in a way
that makes owners and nonowners alike better off, subjective well-
being provides a more reliable basis for measuring property law’s
welfare effects than, say, the wealth-focused approach implicit in
the standard economic-utilitarian approach. And since it is uncon-
troversial that law should seek, at least in large part, to make those
it affects better off, that happiness can provide a better way to
determine welfare effects is important to policy making. This Article
stops short of going full Bentham though. Bentham argued that the
best measure of societal welfare was the sum total of citizens’
happiness, as this Article does, but went a step farther in arguing
that aggregate subjective well-being was the only relevant criterion
for policy making.246 By contrast, this Article takes the position that
net happiness is an important, but not solely relevant, consideration
in decisions about how to craft property law. Welfare matters great-
ly, but policymakers may well want to fold in nonwelfare consider-
ations such as distributive fairness or social justice.247
With this in mind, what would happiness analysis of property law
look like? Such an approach would contrast with deontic theories of
property, such as those that take freedom as a value that should be
sought regardless of consequences. A subjective well-being frame-
work for regulating ownership would instead be explicitly welfarist
in that it would be concerned with the impact of property law on the
246. See BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 1; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
247. Other scholars who advocate net happiness as the best criterion for welfare similarly
allow for the possibility that other considerations should be used in policy making. See, e.g.,
BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 36 (“Lastly, we note that like [cost-benefit analysis],
[well-being analysis] is a tool for analyzing the welfare effects of policies and not a panacea
meant to be the last word on what should be done. Policy analysis often proceeds by analyzing
welfare effects and then weighing those effects against whatever other considerations are
deemed relevant by regulators, legislators, and the citizenry they serve, including fairness,
justice, and human dignity.” (footnotes omitted)).
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lives of those affected by it. Happiness analysis would also differ
from other kinds of welfarist approaches, like progressive property
or Radin’s personhood theory. While those approaches are welfarist
insofar as they are also concerned about consequences (like human
flourishing and self-realization), they are not welfare-maximizing in
the sense that utilitarian approaches are. Of the various theories
discussed in this Subsection, happiness has the most in common
with economics-inflected utilitarianism. Yet it differs from this
framework too in a crucial respect: although most utilitarian ap-
proaches to property explicitly or implicitly use the preferentist
wealth-maximization standard for welfare, a happiness approach
would instead look to individuals’ subjective well-being as the
standard of welfare. In other words, a happiness approach to
property law would assess the appeal of any change in law in terms
of its net effect on the aggregated positive and negative affect of
those subject to the policy. It would regard a policy that had a net
positive effect on happiness as one that improves well-being.248
To see how a happiness framework would play out in the context
of property acquisition, especially as compared to the leading alter-
native of cost-benefit analysis, consider the following hypothetical
example.249 A city is considering two alternative development plans
for a vacant acre of land. One option is to sell the land to a private
developer to create a luxury condominium development; the other
is to pay a different developer to create a public park with green
space as well as community tennis courts. Assume that both devel-
opments will cost the same amount. From a cost-benefit perspective,
the first option likely appears more attractive. The state would gain
liquid resources while the development would create jobs, generate
numerous housing starts,250 and contribute to longer-term economic
growth. Cost-benefit analysis would have a harder time calculating
the benefits of the park, the advantages of which cannot be easily
248. Still, well-being would not necessarily, for reasons explained above, constitute the sole
determinant of the appropriate policy outcome. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying
text.
249. For a detailed exploration of how a well-being analysis would compare to cost-benefit
analysis of a past EPA regulation, see BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 40-44.
250. The U.S. Census Bureau regards each separate dwelling as a housing start, so a single
multi-unit development would be statistically recorded as generating numerous housing
starts. See New Residential Construction Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/construction/nrc/definitions/index.html [https://perma.cc/QTW4-M235].
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understood in dollar terms.251 Happiness analysis would tell a
different story. The construction of the condominiums would indeed
spur more wealth for the developer and nicer housing for the
residents. But neither of these would necessarily create more
subjective well-being because wealth generates little happiness
beyond a subsistence level, and studies of people who move from
good to marginally better housing do not demonstrate any increased
well-being.252 By contrast, open green space and shared recreational
facilities promise to bring people together in a shared setting,
resulting in happiness-producing socializing (not to mention the
possible well-being boosts of health and appreciation of nature).253
A more detailed analysis from both perspectives would be needed to
make a conclusive choice between these options.254 This example
serves simply to illustrate that cost-benefit analysis and happiness
analysis use very different policy-making criteria and may produce
starkly different outcomes. 
And while the ambition of this Article is limited to property
acquisition, it is worth noting that other ownership controversies
251. This is not to say that cost-benefit analysis could not estimate the park’s value by, for
example, looking to revealed preferences such as home values near parks as a way to identify
people’s willingness to pay for proximity to such amenities. That said, cost-benefit analysis
is well-known and much criticized for overvaluing direct monetary benefits or costs in relation
to those plusses or minuses that are more difficult to quantify. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman &
Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2002) (discussing the failings of cost-benefit analysis in the
environmental protection context).
252. See supra Part I.B.2. The increased employment generated by the project would, in
contrast, likely provide positive subjective well-being because there is substantial (though not
uncontroverted) evidence that unemployment makes people very unhappy. See, e.g., Richard
E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8,
10-11 (2004).
253. Numerous studies detail the positive impact of urban green spaces on residents’
happiness. See, e.g., Mathew P. White et al., Would You Be Happier Living in a Greener Urban
Area? A Fixed-Effects Analysis of Panel Data, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 920, 926 (2013) (indicating
that people living near green areas reported less mental distress and higher well-being).
There is also evidence that parks lead to better mental and physical health. See Ian Alcock
et al., Longitudinal Effects on Mental Health of Moving to Greener and Less Green Urban
Areas, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1247, 1253-54 (2014) (showing the positive effects such moves
have on mental health); USDA Forest Serv., Urban Trees Remove Fine Particulate Air
Pollution, Save Lives, SCIENCEDAILY (June 19, 2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2013/06/130619164708.htm [https://perma.cc/9W6T-E4A9] (showing the same for physical
health).
254. For instance, if the funds the city used to develop the park traded off with food aid or
health social services, the park’s net well-being impact could be negative.
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could be refracted through the prism of subjective well-being.
Happiness would likely positively regard cases that limit owners’
property rights in favor of broader social interests. Shack’s limita-
tion on one owner’s rights so that social services could be provided
to migrant workers placed only a slight, temporary, and adaptable
restriction on the owner’s subjective well-being and assures for
many others basic health, which is strongly associated with happi-
ness.255 The same is likely true of Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n, in
which a judicially imposed easement over one owner’s private prop-
erty likely increased social happiness by enabling access to a state
beach where numerous people could recreate and socialize.256 These
two examples should not be taken to mean that happiness tends to
favor a limited version of owners’ rights in all instances, though.
Panther Valley, in which a judge permitted a private homeowners
association to exclude a category three sex offender from living in
their community,257 was probably rightly decided from a happiness
perspective. The hedonic costs of denying one individual space in a
given residential community are likely lower than the reduction in
well-being to the other residents, who would otherwise experience
ongoing uncertainty and discomfort of knowing that a registered sex
offender lived near them.258
* * * 
Scholars have articulated a multiplicity of normative theories to
make sense of the institution of property. And while all of these
255. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971).
256. See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J.
2005); see also Amanda L. Chan, Exercise Makes Us Happy—It’s Science, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 9, 2012, 7:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/exercise-happy-enthusi
asm-excitement_n_1263345.html [https://perma.cc/3WH4-W589] (describing results of a study
showing that physically active people reported significantly higher levels of happiness).
257. See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass’n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
258. Of course, one might argue that regardless of the net hedonic effects in this case,
fairness considerations oblige people to allow ex-criminals to live in their midst. After all, we
would not tolerate a community’s distaste at permitting minority group members as a valid
basis for their imposing race- or religion-based exclusions. But this simply illustrates a point
developed above: this Article’s claim is only that happiness provides the best metric for
assessing whether a given property rule is welfare-enhancing, not whether it is the best policy
decision when nonwelfarist considerations are taken into account.
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accounts differ in foundational ways, one thing they do have in
common is that they rely on certain factual premises about property:
that it makes us freer, produces more virtuous owners and richer
communities, provides an outlet for identity, or just plain makes us
wealthier. Yet as the foregoing Part illustrates, recent findings on
the relationship between property and subjective well-being throw
shade on all of the empirical propositions underlying these theories.
Acquiring more property does not necessarily enhance our sense of
autonomy, provide a means of self-expression, enrich our local
community, or make us better-off overall. But beyond destabilizing
some of the major normative theories of property, can hedonics
provide a coherent framework of its own? The answer outlined
briefly above is a qualified affirmative one. To the extent that any
given property theory invokes some feature or value as important
for welfare reasons, that feature or value is likely to be subsumed
by a happiness analysis. But it may be appropriate for judges and
policymakers to consider the deontic relevance of considerations like
personhood, autonomy, or community in decisions regarding prop-
erty, as this Article takes the position only that happiness is the
best criterion for welfare, and not that welfare is the sole relevant
consideration for policymakers.
III. HAPPINESS AND PROPERTY LAW
The previous Part used hedonics to expose empirical weaknesses
in leading normative property theories and to sketch briefly how
happiness may serve as a superior framework for—or at least a
major input into—decisions about how we should regulate owner-
ship. Part III will discuss how these theoretical ideas translate into
specific changes in property law that may increase overall societal
well-being. At first blush, the notion of basing public policy on (or
even allowing it to be influenced by) something as abstract as
happiness may seem peculiar. But after decades of research showing
the reliability and validity of hedonics studies, world leaders such
as British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President
Nicolas Sarkozy have urged that happiness and well-being be
considered in guiding public policy.259 The tiny nation of Bhutan has
259. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Everybody Have Fun: What Can Policymakers Learn from
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even scorned the traditional metric of national well-being—gross
domestic product—in favor of a “gross national happiness” index.260
And scholars both within the legal academy and from other
disciplines have endorsed the use of subjective well-being studies as
a potential means of determining optimal social policy.261 As these
examples illustrate, the emergence of happiness as a factor in major
public policy debates is hardly strange at all. In fact, it follows a
very simple intuition: we pass laws to make people better off, so
evidence about what makes people actually happier is necessarily
relevant to discussions about what law should do.
Before discussing the implications that happiness research about
property acquisition has for positive law, some qualifications are in
order. The idea developed in the previous Part is big: despite the
general American aspiration to constantly acquire more property,
doing so may not make us better off in the elemental sense of
increasing our well-being. One might plausibly think that the
nonrelationship between property and happiness warrants founda-
tionally rethinking, or even abandoning, the legal institution of
ownership. Yet the ambition of this Part is more modest for a pair
of reasons. First, this Article aims only at laws related to the acqui-
sition of property, not to securing its possession or allocating it to
the public. This is because the evidence discussed in Part I indicates
only that acquiring property may reduce, or simply not affect, our
subjective well-being. It does not address the impact on happiness
of losing property one already owns or having access to public land
like parks or beaches.262 Second, the evidence outlined in Part I
reveals a complex relationship between property and acquisition
that demands a similarly nuanced approach to discussing its policy
Happiness Research?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2010/03/22/everybody-have-fun [https://perma.cc/8V6P-ESKZ] (book review); see also Allegra
Stratton, David Cameron Aims to Make Happiness the New GDP, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2010,
4:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/14/david-cameron-wellbeing-inquiry
[https://perma.cc/UZ4X-KU3A] (discussing David Cameron’s support for promoting happiness
through public policy).
260. See Adler, supra note 61, at 1516-17 (discussing Bhutan’s approach).
261. See generally, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN
LEARN FROM THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010).
262. Indeed, there are a number of reasons to think that weakening trespass or theft laws
would be costly in terms of net subjective well-being. Scholars agree that security in one’s
possessions is a leading factor contributing to one’s happiness. See, e.g., HAYBRON, supra note
14, at 55.
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implications. The hedonics studies about the effects of getting
property do not simply show that all owners become miserable, but
rather identify a conflicted relationship between acquisition and
subjective well-being that clashes with the dominant social narra-
tive that buying more land and chattels is the ticket to happiness.263
Perhaps the most important implication of these studies is that it is
the intention animating acquisition, not the act of acquisition itself,
that determines whether property will make us happier.264 With
these limits in mind, this Part proceeds to explore how happiness
would make us look at property law differently in three steps: first,
by identifying extant property laws and policies that may reduce our
subjective well-being; second, by suggesting novel policies that may
enhance it; and, third, by indicating other ways to enhance our
happiness via property beyond the law and policy of acquisition.
A. Happiness and Homeownership Promotion
As Part I detailed, we are told by public and private sources ad
nauseam that homeownership represents the American dream, yet
a growing body of work suggests that buying houses does not
improve owners’ lives.265 What should law do about this? The
purchase of a private home or any other big-ticket item is a product
of the sort of private market exchange that the state is rightly loath
to ban. However, the residential housing market is far from purely
free. On the contrary, it is heavily regulated, especially in the form
of numerous incentives that embody the U.S. government’s long-
standing policy of encouraging homeownership.266 These market
interventions take several forms. The most familiar is the mortgage
interest deduction on federal tax, which has been celebrated by
263. See Higgins, supra note 91 (discussing various studies that analyze the correlation
between homeownership and happiness).
264. See id.
265. See generally supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. The title of Grace Wong
Bucchianeri’s empirical study of the hedonic impact of homeownership, The American Dream
or the American Delusion?, epitomizes the point. See generally Bucchianeri, supra note 46.
266. Beyond the pro-homeownership policies discussed in this Part, the real estate market
is regulated by the Truth in Lending Act and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act,
both of which require disclosures and restrict certain practices in the mortgage industry. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1667(f) (2012). In addition, commercial banks and lending institutions
are subject to both federal and state regulations to assure minimum capital requirements and
diverse loan portfolios. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2012).
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politicians and real estate industry associations alike as the major
means by which the state encourages homeownership over
renting.267 The deduction allows owners to deduct from as many as
two homes both mortgage interest and property taxes and includes
numerous other homeowner-friendly, tax-reducing provisions.268 The
federal government also promotes homeownership through a variety
of administrative guises. Most familiarly, the government-sponsored
enterprises colloquially known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have historically guaranteed many home mortgages and have
acquired lenders’ housing portfolios to facilitate mortgage origina-
tion.269 And the Federal Housing Administration both makes loans
to lower-income buyers and insures qualified mortgages, all in an
attempt to increase homeownership by facilitating home finan-
cing.270 Finally, the federal government has sounded a constant
drumbeat of rhetoric framing home purchase as an essential part of
citizenship, from the 1918 “Own Your Own Home” program271 to the
state’s constant assertion that homeownership is the “American
dream.”272 This rhetorical posture has had real-world consequences
267. For a good historical overview of government pro-homeownership policies, which
actually date to the early part of the twentieth century, see generally Michael S. Carliner,
Development of Federal Homeownership “Policy,” 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299 (1998).
268. For example, owners may roll over the proceeds from the sale of one home into the
purchase of another without being taxed on those profits. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB.
NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (2015).
269. Both Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) went into receivership during the financial crisis
of 2008 due largely to their own exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities, not to
the default on mortgages they had purchased. See W. SCOTT FRAME ET AL., FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 719, THE RESCUE OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 5,
18 (2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RSY7-RHGN]. Although they formally remain in receivership, they both
continue to buy mortgages and sell mortgage-backed securities, and profit handsomely from
doing so. See id. at 5.
270. See The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory [https://perma.
cc/9D6R-UMGW].
271. See Carliner, supra note 267, at 301 (discussing this policy and the history of federal
efforts to promote homeownership generally).
272. Embrace of the “American dream” metaphor transcends party lines. Compare Shaun
Donovan, Promoting the American Dream of Homeownership, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 6, 2013,
5:50 PM), https://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/08/06/promoting-american-
dream-homeownership [https://perma.cc/FTS5-3M5U] (praising President Obama’s policies
protecting and promoting homeownership as furthering the “American dream”), with Remarks
on Signing the American Dream Downpayment Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1733 (Dec. 16, 2003)
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in the form of pushing the less wealthy toward homeownership,
which in turn was part of the impetus for the increase in subprime
mortgages that precipitated the financial crisis of 2008.273
Yet hedonic psychology casts substantial doubt on the wisdom of
this large-scale state intervention in the housing market. Despite
the federal government’s full-court press in favor of buying residen-
tial property, studies have repeatedly shown that acquisition of a
desired residence does not enhance owners’ well-being. Moreover,
the very means by which the federal government seeks to encourage
homeownership could be part of the problem. One factor that can
make the acquisition of property, and in particular residential hous-
ing, harmful to happiness is regarding it primarily as a lucrative
investment rather than as a home that will facilitate memorable
experiences and foster rich social connections. All the available
incentives for home acquisition, however, come in the form of
financial advantages. Tax breaks and lower-cost mortgages tend to
cause home purchasers to regard their house as an investment or
even an ATM,274 a framing more likely to encourage materialism
and thereby reduce subjective well-being. So if the U.S. government
were to cease encouraging homeownership via financial induce-
ments, the remaining participants in the market would, to a greater
extent, consist of those who are encouraged by the kind of nonmon-
etary incentives that are likely to result in happier purchases.275
(quoting President George W. Bush speaking about the importance of protecting the “Amer-
ican dream” by providing down-payment assistance to homeowners).
273. See supra note 270. The U.S. government encouraged the acquisition of homes to
subprime (that is, lower-income) borrowers throughout the 1990s and 2000s by, inter alia,
repealing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and thereby eradicating the wall between investment
and consumer banks, creating a robust secondary market for mortgages at the Federal
National Mortgage Association, taking a hands-off regulatory approach to mortgage lenders’
increasingly low standards for borrowers, and rhetorically pushing the idea of homeownership
among lower-income and historically disadvantaged groups. See generally Cyrus Sanati, 10
Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/ [https://
perma.cc/LYE7-CMEE].
274. See Field Guide to Mortgage Interest Deduction, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, http://www.
realtor.org/field-guides/field-guide-to-mortgage-interest-deduction [https://perma.cc/NJ72-
LSQK] (last updated Jan. 2016) (discussing houses as tax shelters); see also Frontline: The
Card Game, supra note 5 (reporting that owners increasingly use home equity lines of credit
to liquidate the equity in their homes for extra spending money).
275. In Canada, for example, homeowners receive no tax breaks for mortgage interest or
property tax, and regulators require mortgage originators to research borrowers’ history
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How to dismantle the state pro-homeownership apparatus poses
a difficult challenge, though, for at least two reasons. First, not all
home purchases reduce subjective well-being. Purchasing a home to
show off one’s wealth or to meet some external expectation of
success is likely to make the buyer less happy, but a home purchase
designed solely to provide a secure domestic space may have positive
effects on happiness, especially since time spent socializing with
loved ones tends to make us much happier.276 Second, there are
other advantages to encouraging homeownership short of conspicu-
ous consumption, such as the familiar argument that owners are
more invested in their neighborhoods than renters, resulting in
better upkeep of property and higher rates of civic participation.277
Even in light of these caveats, though, the mortgage tax deduction
fares poorly.278 The deduction mostly facilitates wealthy people’s
ability to buy houses larger than they could otherwise afford (the
kind of conspicuous consumerism that tends to reduce happiness),
while it has relatively little impact on securing basic homes for
lower-income Americans (the kind of modest, family-driven property
extensively before lending them money. See Michael Hiltzik, How Canada Is Not Like the
United States: Home Mortgage Edition, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
2014/jan/16/business/la-fi-mh-canada-20140116 [https://perma.cc/4TFC-BDG7]. Yet the home-
ownership rate in Canada remains high. Cf. id. (noting that Canada’s housing market is doing
well despite the absence of government-sponsored financial incentives to encourage home-
ownership). The interesting question for happiness and property, then, is whether Canadian
homeowners exhibit higher subjective well-being than their American counterparts. So far,
no one has done such a study.
276. See Matthew Kassel, The Psychology of Buying and Selling a House, WALL STREET J.
(June 12, 2016, 10:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-psychology-of-buying-and-selling-
a-house-1465783741 [https://perma.cc/E2TR-396Q] (discussing multiple studies showing more
expensive homes or residences farther from friends and family negatively impact well-being);
Rosenbloom, supra note 115 (describing the positive correlation between strong relationships
and happiness, and explaining that purchasing luxury goods may interfere with happiness).
277. See William M. Rohe & Leslie S. Stewart, Homeownership and Neighborhood Sta-
bility, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 37, 45, 70-72 (1996) (finding a positive relationship between
homeownership and property maintenance, reduced mobility, and property values). A great
deal of evidence, however, suggests that there is no such relationship. See Stern, supra note
177, at 1122-23 (citing numerous studies casting doubt on the proposition that homeowners
are more civically engaged or better at keeping up their property).
278. See Paul Sullivan, Despite Critics, Mortgage Deduction Resists Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/your-money/despite-critics-mortgage-
interest-deduction-persists.html [https://perma.cc/BHF9-QUVW] (explaining that the mort-
gage tax deduction has not helped expand homeownership but that it has expanded the
purchase of larger homes).
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acquisition most likely to increase happiness).279 Along similar lines,
the Federal Housing Administration’s provision of mortgage insur-
ance may reassure lenders who make risky home loans,280 but may
not make buyers any happier.281 Taking on excessive debt loads is
a leading reason that homeownership does not make people feel any
better, and the constant risk of falling behind on excessive payments
(let alone actual default and foreclosure) exacerbates this hap-
piness-diminishing dynamic.282
In light of these concerns, one option would be to simply repeal
all of these homeownership-promotion policies.283 The mortgage
interest deduction in particular has long been the target of bipar-
tisan criticism, though proposals to phase it out have always been
stymied by the real estate lobby.284 Another possible approach would
be to modify federal housing incentives in ways designed to opti-
mize happiness. Capping the home mortgage deduction at some
279. See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/magazine/who-needs-the-mortgage
interest-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/72TS-TEG6]; Gerald Prante, Who Benefits from the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/
taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff49.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM9Z-6T63]; see also supra notes 91-92
(discussing the positive impact of home purchases focused on social relationships and the
negative impact of home purchases focused on the physical characteristics of the home).
280. See The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), supra note 270.
281. See What Is Mortgage Insurance and How Does It Work?, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1953/what-is-mortgage-insurance-and-how-
does-it-work.html [https://perma.cc/7FQX-TTZW] (explaining the risks a borrower takes on
even with mortgage insurance).
282. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. For example, the home ownership subsi-
dies created by President Johnson as part of the Great Society reforms have been regarded
as unmitigated disasters because they led lower-income borrowers to make unwise financing
choices, leading to widespread mortgage default. See Evaluating the Success of the Great
Society, WASH. POST (May 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/
great-society-at-50/ [https://perma.cc/333D-WXU5] (describing President Johnson’s Great
Society programs, including those related to housing); cf. James Surowiecki, The Mortgage
Mistake, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/12/
mortgage-mistake [https://perma.cc/BP2S-6DQX] (describing the increase in mortgage de-
faults by people who have purchased more expensive homes because of mortgage deductions).
283. See Lowenstein, supra note 279 (“A .... salable approach would be to kill the deduction
in stages .... Over time, it would simply disappear. Congress could do that; it should do it.”).
284. See Jennifer Liberto, Fiscal Battle Over Mortgage Deduction, CNN MONEY (Nov. 27,
2012, 11:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/27/real_estate/housing-mortgage-interest-tax/
[https://perma.cc/6WKP-3556] (describing failed congressional attempts to repeal the deduc-
tion in 2012); Lowenstein, supra note 279 (describing bipartisan efforts during the 2000s to
repeal the deduction).
1916 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1851
level—say, 50 percent of the average value of homes in the local
area—could encourage the acquisition of the kinds of relatively
modest homes that have more potential to increase owners’ well-
being while ceasing to incentivize the kind of extravagance that
tends to be toxic for happiness.285 Another approach would be lower-
ing the availability of the mortgage tax deduction to the $75,000
household income threshold at which additional acquisition ceases
to correlate with increased happiness.286 Although not directly keyed
to home value, this strategy would likely have a similar effect
because below a given income level, buyers are much more likely to
be able to purchase only a modest home that meets their family’s
basic needs.287 It would also cease to function as an incentive for the
wealthy to buy the kinds of larger trophy homes that tend not to
increase subjective well-being.288
285. See Lowenstein, supra note 279 (discussing a tax reform proposal capping the tax
interest deduction); Rosenbloom, supra note 115 (describing findings that wealth and purchas-
ing luxury goods lead to a sense of one-upmanship that interferes with a person’s happiness).
286. See Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 78, at 16,489, 16,492. The state already places
some caps on the ability of homeowners to enjoy tax relief. See, e.g., Property Tax Relief Cred-
it, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/property/property-tax-relief.htm
[https://perma.cc/K7FX-PYX9] (last updated March 3, 2017) (describing New York State’s tax
relief credit, which caps at an income of $275,000). For example, owners can claim a mortgage
interest and property tax deduction for nonresident properties, but only if they make less
than $150,000 per year. See Tax Planning for Owning a Second Home, KIPLINGER, http://www.
kiplinger.com/article/taxes/T010-C000-S001-tax-rules-for-second-homes.html [https://perma.
cc/3D2R-TT3X] (last updated Jan. 2015). And the $5000 tax credits the federal government
offered first-time home buyers as part of the housing reforms following the mortgage crisis
of 2008 were unavailable to those whose income exceeded $75,000 per year. See First-Time
Homebuyer Credit Questions and Answers: Basic Information, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/first-time-homebuyer-credit-questions-and-answers-basic-information
[https://perma.cc/R8RU-Q3BE] (last updated Nov. 6, 2009).
287. See Bob Sullivan, For 1 in 8 Americans, a $100K Income Is Required to Buy a Median-
Priced Home, MSN MONEY (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/for-1-in-8-
americans-a-dollar100k-income-is-required-to-buy-a-median-priced-home/ar-BB7ee1c [https://
perma.cc/Z8NN-HSRL] (describing the difficulty most Americans face when purchasing even
average homes if they make less than $100,000); see also Jonnelle Marte, 5 Reasons Someone
Making $75,000 Would Live Paycheck to Paycheck, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2015/04/22/5-reasons-someone-making-75000-would-
live-paycheck-to-paycheck/ [https://perma.cc/CJ6P-XMJC] (explaining most families making
$75,000 do not have money for excess expenditures).
288. See Jonathan Clements, Money Can Also Buy You Unhappiness, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 29, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/money-can-also-buy-you-unhappiness-
1417310263 [https://perma.cc/JGG3-JEBF] (describing the ways purchasing a larger house
can make a person unhappy); Surowiecki, supra note 282 (explaining that current tax
deductions incentivize people to buy bigger houses).
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These potential reforms of property public policy have private
analogues as well. Residential real estate transactions have long
come under scholarly fire for being needlessly protracted and com-
plex, complicating the process of acquisition and making it less
likely that potential homeowners will buy a given house.289 Authors
have floated various proposals for simplifying the process of buying
residential property, all animated by the plausible notion that
streamlining the home-buying process would be a boon to would-be
acquirers.290 These suggestions dovetail with the state’s policy of
supporting potential buyers by providing easier credit and subsidiz-
ing down payments.291 Hedonics, though, suggests a pair of reasons
that this approach may be welfare-reducing. First, buyers tend to
enjoy more those things they have to wait for before purchasing.292
This is due not only to the fact that the anticipation makes them
appreciate the object of their desire all the more when they finally
achieve it, but also because the experience of anticipatory waiting
289. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Attorney Approval Clauses in Residential Real Estate
Contracts—Is Half a Loaf Better Than None?, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000) (“Buying or
selling a home is often the most significant transaction that the average American will
encounter and is fraught with legal pitfalls.”). The standard residential real estate transaction
entails a detailed sales contract, option period, transfer of earnest money, inspection and
required disclosures (both federal and state), closing and carrying costs, and typically lasts
about a month. In many states, buyers and sellers are typically represented by counsel (as
well as, in most cases, a professional real estate agent) to navigate this sclerotic process. For
a detailed look at this enterprise, see generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT (9th ed. 2015).
290. See, e.g., Noble-Allgire, supra note 289, at 383-84. Consider, for example, the debate
about whether lawyers should represent the parties to a residential real estate transaction.
Some have argued that the involvement of counsel only makes an already complicated process
more contentious and difficult, while others contend that the very complexity of the process
shows that laypeople should not be left to negotiate it on their own. Compare Joyce Palomar,
The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers—Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!,”
31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 439-40 (1999) (describing both realtors’ and homebuyers’ hesitation to
involve lawyers in home purchases), with Shane L. Goudey, Comment, Too Many Hands in
the Cookie Jar: The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers, 75 OR. L. REV. 889,
933-36 (1996) (arguing that lawyers should be required to represent parties to residential real
estate transactions).
291. See Danny Gardner, The Truth About Down Payments and Down Payment Assistance,
FREDDIE MAC (June 29, 2015), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/blog/danny_gardner/2015
0629_down_payments.html [https://perma.cc/UES6-66M3] (describing the assistance state,
county, and city governments provide to homeowners).
292. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 91 (“In short, delaying consumption can
enhance pleasure.”).
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itself can be a distinct and intense source of happiness.293 Protracted
real estate acquisition epitomizes this notion both by creating pleas-
urable anticipation during the long escrow period and then enhanc-
ing the enjoyment of real property once title finally transfers.294
Second, and relatedly, people tend to appreciate more those pur-
chases for which they have worked hard and saved, rather than
those that came with little struggle.295 This highlights at least one
welfare downside of state policies that ease credit and support down
payments: government-assisted acquisition means getting a home
faster, but because it also means less work to achieve that end, it
may make aided buyers less happy with the real property they
acquire.296
Finally, happiness promises to enhance local property regulation
as well. Housing is a positional good.297 That is, the subjective well-
being that owners derive from the value of their homes comes as
much (if not more) from comparisons with nearby homes as it does
from the actual price the house would fetch on the open market.298
Thus, the owner of the biggest shack on one street may well feel
better about his living situation than the owner of the smallest
mansion on another street.299 Zoning law therefore has an under-
appreciated capacity to affect owners’ subjective well-being by
293. See id. at 87-89 (detailing the hedonic upsides of waiting for an object of desire).
294. Cf. id. at 88-89 (noting that the pleasure of delayed acquisition is particularly acute
when people can see or viscerally experience the thing that is not quite theirs yet). Visiting
and walking through a sale-pending house during a real estate transaction may enhance the
happiness derived from eventual ownership. See id.
295. See id. at 92-103 (explaining how the instinct to delay payment tends to reduce
happiness, so that we would likely be better off saving money and paying upon purchase
rather than relying on get now, pay later credit transactions).
296. Cf. id. at 92 (explaining that delays caused by work on a consumer’s behalf before a
purchase can increase the consumer’s satisfaction).
297. See FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 11, 27 (1976) (coining this phrase);
Michael Schneider, The Nature, History and Significance of the Concept of Positional Goods,
45 HIST. ECON. REV. 60, 60-64 (2007) (outlining a taxonomy of positional goods).
298. See Thomas Aronsson & Andrea Mannberg, Positional Preferences for Housing:
Income Taxation as a Second-Best Policy? 2 (July 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:739555/FULLTEXT01.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW6D-
RFQR] (explaining the relationship between subjective well-being and relative consumption
of highly positional goods such as housing).
299. See Susane J. Leguizamon & Justin M. Ross, Revealed Preference for Relative Status:
Evidence from the Housing Market, 21 J. HOUSING ECON. 55, 56 (2012) (suggesting that people
prefer to have a smaller house if it achieves an increase in their relative status by putting
them next to even smaller neighbors).
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determining the degree of housing homogeneity in residential
areas.300 A locality that zoned housing to permit very little variation
in size or amenities would result in an even distribution of subjec-
tive well-being among property owners, while one that permitted
wide differentials in home construction would allow much more
variation.301 Because positional goods are zero-sum,302 zoning law
could not increase net social welfare in this way. Rather, this exam-
ple illustrates a different way that property law can impact
subjective well-being—in this case through its distributional conse-
quences.
B. Nudging Property Toward Happiness
In light of the lack of any evidence that acquiring residential
property actually benefits owners’ subjective well-being, pulling
back on market interventions designed to increase home purchases
represents a straightforward kind of happiness-enhancing reform.
A harder question is how law might actively seek to ameliorate the
inverse relationship between buying property and subjective well-
being. Here, too, caution is warranted for several reasons. For one
thing, a lot of happiness research has been done, but returns are
still coming in.303 While many scholars have explored the promise of
this work to craft public policy, others have urged caution until the
evidence is more conclusive.304 Paternalistic laws may be welfare-
enhancing,305 but only when people do not make optimal decisions
300. Cf. id. (describing potential implications of the relative status effect on zoning
regulations).
301. Cf. id. (explaining that an individual’s knowledge of having a lower relative status
than another person negatively impacts the individual’s subjective well-being).
302. See Schneider, supra note 297, at 63.
303. See Huang, supra note 28, at 424 (“Happiness measures clearly offer policy makers
information that supplements more traditional nonhappiness measures. But many open and
fascinating questions remain in the social science study of happiness.”).
304. Cass Sunstein, for example, has expressed optimism about the potential of happiness
to serve as a basis for public policy, but has also cautioned that much of the research remains
too general to provide clear directions for policy generally. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Who’s Your Daddy?, 7 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 107, 114-18 (2016); see also Huang,
supra note 28, at 424 (“Ultimately, happiness studies offer not only many possibilities, but
also many pitfalls in developing legal policies.”).
305. For a great discussion of the potential upsides of paternalist policies, see generally
Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998).
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for themselves306 and when a given law will improve their decision-
making processes.307 The hedonics literature meets the first
criterion by showing that our tendency to acquire more property
does not necessarily make us any happier.308 But whether the state
should pass laws designed to improve our property decision-making
remains a hard question that hedonics studies cannot answer.
Governments could simply outlaw conduct that appears self-harm-
ing, but the challenges of implementation and public or judicial
opposition can counteract any welfare gains such laws would
otherwise generate.309 In light of these concerns, this Part takes a
more modest approach, engaging in a thought experiment about
what kinds of property-related policy moves may increase happi-
ness. This discussion considers two possible kinds of such laws:
those that seek to burden (though not preclude) happiness-diminish-
ing choices, and those that seek to enhance (while still influencing)
such choices.
1. Choice-Burdening Strategies
Property law may help enhance overall subjective well-being to
the extent that it can serve as a lever to nudge people in the
direction of happier choices, at least when happiness relates to
acquisition in some way.310 Consider, for example, the commuting
paradox. Home buyers typically focus on physical features of
attractive homes (which are especially subject to hedonic adapta-
tion) in outlying areas, underestimating the psychological costs of
306. See id. at 268-71 (listing factors that negatively impact an individual’s ability to make
optimal choices).
307. See id. at 276.
308. See Higgins, supra note 91 (explaining that hedonic adaptation causes people to find
less joy in home purchases over time).
309. A classic example is New York City’s controversial “Big Gulp Ban,” which sought to
prevent the sale of any soda over sixteen ounces in certain businesses. See Joseph Ax,
Bloomberg’s Ban on Big Sodas Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (July 30, 2013, 6:58 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sodaban-lawsuit-idUSBRE96T0UT20130730 [https://perma.
cc/TTE7-GEFQ]. Ironically, the law did not actually ban Big Gulps, since it did not apply to
convenience stores. See id. This and other inconsistencies between the law’s application and
its purpose led to its being held unconstitutional by a New York state appeals court. See id.
310. See Huang, supra note 26, at 783 (encouraging the enhancement of subjective well-
being by “providing individuals financial incentives and support required to comprehend, act
upon, and apply [positive psychology research] insights”).
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a long commute (which are not).311 Commuting reduces social well-
being in ways that consumers do not predict, resulting in systemic
error in predictions about the effect of home purchase on subjective
well-being.312 In light of this, the state could tweak property law to
nudge people in the direction of shorter commutes. Consider, for
example, a tax break for those who purchase a home within close
proximity to their workplace.313
There is already some movement on this front. The City of Balti-
more, for example, has a “Live Near Your Work” program that gives
home purchasers grants toward the cost of a down payment if they
live and work within the city limits.314 A federal program along
these lines would leave purchasers free to buy wherever they want-
ed, though it would gently push them in the direction of the kinds
of home purchases that are more likely to create time affluence and
its attendant subjective well-being.315 Some critics of this approach
have pointed out that it entails certain implementation challenges:
many families consist of more than one member with a job,316 and
people change workplaces much more than they did in past years.317
Administering the program would have to take account of these
challenging realities. Despite these concerns, such a program would
be no more difficult to implement than any other tax provisions. The
mortgage tax deduction, for example, functions well even though it
311. See Higgins, supra note 91; see also Kassel, supra note 276 (explaining that prospec-
tive homeowners may not focus on social relationships during the purchase process, as they
mainly pay attention to the physical characteristics of the home).
312. See Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress That Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting Paradox,
110 SCANDANAVIAN J. ECONOMICS 339, 341-61 (2008) (presenting data supporting this com-
muting paradox).
313. A more nuanced version of this approach could be to give home purchasers graduated
tax relief within a certain limit—for example, a rule might allow homeowners to deduct their
mortgage interest and property tax by some multiplier inversely related to the distance they
live from their workplace.
314. See Baltimore City Live Near Your Work Program, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BALT. CITY,
http://www.baltimorehousing.org/homeownership_livenear [https://perma.cc/DGV5-ZUPW].
315. See Higgins, supra note 91 (explaining that home purchases allowing owners to enjoy
more free time increases homeowners’ happiness).
316. See Raising Kids and Running a Household: How Working Parents Share the Load,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/04/raising-kids-and-
running-a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load/ [https://perma.cc/MVH3-NY6A].
317. See Penelope Trunk, Why Job Hoppers Make the Best Employees, CBS MONEYWATCH
(July 29, 2010, 3:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-job-hoppers-make-the-best-
employees/ [https://perma.cc/32P7-MJB9] (stating that people in their twenties and thirties
frequently change jobs).
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turns on the definitions of slippery terms like “principal residence”
and “acquisition indebtedness.”318
Incentivizing shorter commutes exemplifies the kind of housing
market intervention that may encourage happiness-enhancing prop-
erty acquisition.319 But one could imagine the reverse approach:
policies that seek to discourage the purchase of goods that have
been shown to decrease subjective well-being.320 This approach first
requires us to consider what kinds of consumer goods create enough
unhappiness to warrant deterring their acquisition via taxation. As
just one illustration, consider the television.321 Having a huge TV in
the living room may be more American than apple pie, and the
United States is just one of many countries in which people spend
about as much time watching TV as they do working.322 Despite
what revealed preferences suggest, though, mounting evidence
shows that however much one may find the purchase of a brand-
new, fifty-two-inch flat screen intoxicating, fancy new televisions
are sinkholes for happiness.323 For one thing, TVs represent the clas-
sic kind of luxury item subject to positional comparison—because
318. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (2012).
319. See Stutzer & Frey, supra note 312, at 363 (finding “a large negative effect of com-
muting time on people’s satisfaction with life” and suggesting that this finding should
influence individuals’ decisions about where to live).
320. This strategy is familiar from the multitude of “sin taxes” that the state imposes on
activities like smoking and drinking alcohol, though these taxes are usually articulated in
terms of the third-party costs of such activities. See Megan McArdle, Why States Like Sin
Taxes, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 23, 2015, 9:32 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/
2015-01-23/what-states-get-out-of-sin-taxes [https://perma.cc/ZEC9-KM7J] (explaining how
sin taxes benefit consumers by reducing or deterring consumption of unhealthy substances).
One might think that taxes in themselves may make people unhappy enough to undermine
any second-order improvements in subjective well-being, but studies have cast doubt on the
proposition that taxation reduces happiness. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Taxes, Happiness,
and Heliocentrism, 123 TAX NOTES 1041, 1041 (2009) (showing that some of the most heavily
taxed societies are also the happiest).
321. For another example, research has shown that despite their higher prices, luxury cars
bring their owners no greater happiness than standard vehicles. See Schwarz & Xu, supra
note 87, at 144.
322. See Giacomo Corneo, Work and Television, 21 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 99, 110 (2005). This
factor alone may do much to explain why televisions appear to make us unhappier: while
people today spend less of their nonwork time doing chores, they often fill this time with
watching TV instead of engaging in activities more likely to enhance happiness, such as
socializing with friends or family. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 66-67.
323. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 66 (“More than any other activity, television
appears responsible for the failure of the U-index [, a leading universal measure of happiness,]
to budge over the past four decades.”).
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they are sold in size increments that allow a direct comparison—and
status competitions—because they are large and visible in friends’
and neighbors’ homes.324 In light of all this, televisions are suscepti-
ble to hedonic adaptation that often begins the moment people
return home with them. They are fixed and unchanging, and
viewers quickly treat increased picture quality as their expected
baseline, forgetting the improvement over the previous version.325
Perhaps worse, televisions have been shown to erode the quantity
and quality of family and social relationships,326 two of the factors
most strongly associated with moment-to-moment happiness.327
But even if some consumer goods tend to reduce our subjective
well-being, what ought the state do about it? An outright ban on
these goods would be unwise, considering the other social costs it
would impose (damaging the entertainment and advertising
industries), not to mention the Orwellian nature of such a law.328 A
disincentive, such as a federal excise tax on happiness-reducing
consumer goods, may be more plausible. An across-the-board price
increase would reduce acquisition,329 and, all other things being
equal, this price increase would prevent at least some consumers
324. See PHILIP C. WATKINS, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 101, at 109 (2016) (“If I buy a 48-inch
television but you show me your newly purchased 62-inch screen, this will likely pour cold
water on the joy of my material purchase.”).
325. Cf. James Surowiecki, Technology and Happiness, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 1, 2005),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/403558/technology-and-happiness/ [https://perma.cc/
QHH4-DALZ] (discussing how technology advancements do not increase happiness over time).
326. Cf. LAYARD, supra note 21, at 86-88 (showing that when television was introduced into
Bhutan and remote parts of Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, the immediate result was a
decline in the amount of time people spent with their families as well as upticks in aggres-
sion).
327. See LYUBOMIRSKY, supra note 80, at 205-06 (detailing the positive impact of close
social relationships on health and happiness). There was a time when families typically owned
only a single television, so at least they tended to watch it together. See LAYARD, supra note
21, at 86. But increasingly, homes feature numerous televisions that allow each family
member to watch their own shows, all alone. See id.
328. And the likelihood that banning television would risk the violent overthrow of the
government. I am indebted to John Bronsteen for pointing out this apocalyptic probability.
329. Such an excise tax would operate much like a traditional Pigouvian tax, except it
would be aimed at a second-party rather than third-party externalities. See generally ARTHUR
CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1952). Economists
sometimes felicitously refer to the former as “internalities.” See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al.,
Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 149, 151-52, 177-80 (1993) (coining this phrase and expressing skepticism
about government strategies aimed at it).
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from purchasing a good that would unwittingly sap their happiness.
But this story too is complex. Sellers may internalize part of the tax
increase by lowering prices. Independently, excise taxes are blunt
instruments that price out certain consumers only on the basis of
their unwillingness or inability to pay a higher price.330 So simply
increasing taxes on luxury goods could backfire if it deters only
consumers who are more price-sensitive because they are more
careful about thinking through the effect of their purchase decisions
on their happiness. Thus, the kind of consumers who such price
increases are least likely to deter may be the ones who are in a
materialist mania of acquisition and most likely to be making a
happiness-diminishing decision.331 Fortunately, the evidence does
not appear to support this critique. Rather, it indicates that the
reason buying certain consumer goods decreases our well-being is
that they inflict second-order costs (such as trading off with activ-
ities like socialization) that are beyond the ability of even the most
thoughtful consumer to predict.332 And state-imposed burdens on
consuming harmful goods can have positive as well as negative
second-order effects. Policies aimed at reducing the purchase and
consumption of television, for example, may not only succeed in
these aims, but may also have the side effect of causing consumers
to enjoy those activities even more, although (and perhaps because)
they engage in them less frequently.333
330. See, e.g., infra note 333 (explaining how higher cigarette taxes reduce smoking).
331. Moreover, people who will tend to be more immune to the effects of price increases on
televisions—or any other consumer good—will be wealthier, and thus already in the class of
persons for whom additional increments of possession are unlikely to generate much
happiness. See supra notes 78-79.
332. See generally Gerhard Scherhorn, Implications of the Theory of Consumer Behavior
for Consumer Policy Research, 7 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 52 (1980) (“Products reveal
unexpected costs, e.g., repairs, and negative second order effects such as damages to health.
In general consumer dissatisfaction with goods and services means unforeseen buying risks
or uncovered opportunity costs.”).
333. For example, increasing taxes on cigarettes has been shown not only to reduce
smoking but also to increase the happiness of smokers when they do light up—perhaps
because the increased cost of the cigarettes leads smokers to savor their time in Flavor
Country even more than usual. See Jonathan Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette
Taxes Make Smokers Happier? 3, 18-19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8872, 2002).
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2. Choice-Enhancing Strategies
The preceding Subsection explored the appeal of burdening
choices that appear to reduce subjective well-being. A very different
strategy would take the opposite tack: simply give people informa-
tion about the nonobvious threats that certain kinds of property
acquisition pose to subjective well-being and trust them to make
wiser decisions. Such a strategy seeks to enhance rather than bur-
den choice and could take several forms. The most obvious is a
simple informational campaign via public service announcements.
Such a campaign would seek to inform buyers about the results of
the studies showing that buying a larger house or a fancier car does
little for happiness.334 A variation on this approach would be to
frame the ads in terms of property-related decisions one’s social
peers have made that have affected (or failed to affect) their
happiness. Consider an ad that could pop up on AutoTrader.com
reading: “People who chose to buy a standard vehicle report identi-
cal happiness to those who bought a luxury car.” Or Realtor.com
could feature a banner ad telling readers: “People who bought a
smaller home nearer their work instead of a bigger home that
requires a longer commute reported that they are much happier for
it!”
There is a charged debate on the capacity of information to
change or counteract even self-harming behavior. Some scholars,
including Daniel Kahneman, have argued that our uninformed
intuitions are so fatally flawed that we should never rely on them,
so that any information that leads us away from our instincts can
only help.335 But other scholars have argued that people are so
overloaded with information that adding more of it into their
decision calculus results in worse, not better, decisions.336
334. See Justin Wolfers, A Better Government, One Tweak at a Time, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/upshot/a-better-government-one-tweak-
at-a-time.html [https://perma.cc/RS7H-M5MM] (discussing how information dissemination
may help increase consumer choices).
335. See Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to
Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515, 515, 517 (2009).
336. Cf. Joseph A. Mikels et al., Should I Go with My Gut? Investigating the Benefits of
Emotion-Focused Decision Making, 11 EMOTION 743, 751-52 (2011) (demonstrating in several
experiments that emotions-focused decision-making produced superior results relative to
consciously deliberative decision-making).
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There are several reasons to think that happiness public relations
strategies may succeed in worthwhile behavioral change.337 One way
to think about our tendency to buy property that makes us less
happy is that it is a simple information problem: we are not aware
of the many nonobvious ways that property acquisition can reduce
our subjective well-being. If we had this information, we would
presumably make improved acquisition decisions.338 There is some
evidence that this kind of behavioral change is possible, especially
when it is framed as a general community practice. Studies of social
norms, for example, have shown that people respond better to
descriptions of others’ experiences than to bare reports of informa-
tion about the benefits of changes.339 There is even some evidence
that information, if presented subtly, can counteract the kinds of
unconscious biases that can lead to socially undesirable beliefs.340
And a choice-enhancing approach may even appeal to those concern-
ed about paternalism, since simply giving people information about
recent research on happiness represents the lowest-pressure form
of state interference with private markets. People are free to take
such information into account in their decisions to buy homes or big-
ticket chattels, or to ignore it completely. Ultimately, though, these
337. Information about the hedonic effects of certain purchases could also be disseminated
at points of sale through required disclosures. I decline to explore this strategy for a pair of
reasons. First, such sales typically take place after consumer decisions have been made, so
disclosures are unlikely to impact the decision-making process. And even so, numerous
studies of required disclosures have indicated that they have little impact on consumer
attitudes and beliefs. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes
Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECONOMICS 391, 393-95, 398-99, 413 (2014) (concluding that
psychological factors including limited attention, motivated attention, and biased assessments
of probability on the part of consumers can significantly diminish, or even reverse, the intend-
ed effects of disclosure requirements).
338. See Huang, supra note 26, at 783 (“The least intrusive and most fundamental way in
which legal policy might be able to most effectively and positively affect society is by broadly
disseminating information based upon positive psychology research.”).
339. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1250-52 (2001) (sug-
gesting that informational campaigns are more likely to be effective if they “make clear that
others in the relevant community engage in, and care about, widespread compliance”). Hence
the phrasing of the examples in this Part, which are framed in terms of others’ experiences
instead of as outright admonitions about what or how to buy.
340. Cf. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision
of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1105-08 (2006) (summarizing studies showing
that repeated exposure to information contradicting beliefs about the inferiority of ethnic
groups can diminish implicit racial bias). 
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kinds of small-scale moves will simply require case-by-case analysis
to evaluate their efficacy.341
C. Beyond Acquisition
This Part has thus far considered the ways that law might regu-
late and deregulate property acquisition to improve owners’ subjec-
tive well-being. Acquisition, though, represents only one facet of
law’s interface with property. This Subsection thus briefly outlines
the various other ways in which hedonics research can generate new
insights about law’s interaction with ownership, each of which I
hope to explore in future work. First, federal and state laws each
have numerous provisions designed to prevent dispossession—rath-
er than push acquisition—of property. Supercompensation for state
confiscation of residential property,342 “Homestead Act” tax shel-
ters,343 and rights of redemption for foreclosed homes344 all seek to
prevent owners from losing their homes. These laws seek to help
owners keep property they already own, rather than helping people
become owners in the first instance. These antidispossession laws
may thus operate differently from a hedonic perspective, to the
extent that losing property one already owns may have different
psychological effects than simply not acquiring that property in the
first place. The impact of these kinds of antidispossession laws thus
raises different happiness concerns and invites separate consider-
ation.345
341. See Wolfers, supra note 334 (“It’s not about knowing how to do better, it’s about
testing what works. Experiment relentlessly, keep what works, and discard what doesn’t.”).
342. See Jonathan Levy, Against Supercompensation: A Proposed Limitation on the Land
Buyer’s Right to Elect Between Damages and Specific Performance as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 555, 559 (2004) (explaining that inefficient “supercompensation”
results when a plaintiff can choose between monetary damages and specific performance
when either remedy standing alone would compensate for lost expectations).
343. Different jurisdictions provide different degrees of protection under homestead
exemption laws. Some protect property from creditors only up to a certain value or acreage
and, if homesteads exceed these limits, creditors may still force the sale, though the home-
steader may keep a certain amount of the proceeds of the sale. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.005 (West 2000) (providing that, while Texas’s homestead exemption has no dollar-value
limit, the exemption limits urban homesteads to ten acres and rural homesteads to one
hundred acres, which doubles to two hundred acres for married couples).
344. Many states also provide mortgagors with foreclosed homes to retain ownership
through right of redemption statutes. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (2016).
345. Some early work has been done on this issue from the perspective of using hedonic
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Happiness studies have implications beyond the context of getting
(or losing) private property as well. Start with the debate over the
allocation of public versus private property. An increasing body of
work investigating the hedonic implications of green spaces in
urban areas has shown that municipal parks can have positive
impacts on residents’ happiness to the extent that they encourage
socialization,346 facilitate health and recreation, and increase civic
pride and aesthetic pleasure.347 These findings could reorient the
debate about allocating public and private property both by provi-
ding an objective metric to illustrate the value of reserving common
land, and by suggesting ways to use that land in order to maximize
users’ happiness.348 Finally, hedonics can shed new light on emer-
gent debates about novel conceptual ways to think about property.
Consider, for example, the sharing economy. The present debate
about sharing as an alternative to traditional ownership focuses on
the many economic implications of the nascent trend toward shar-
ing, such as the pros and cons of widely distributed entrepreneur-
ship and the extent to which it should be taxed and regulated.349
But hedonics has the potential to shed an entirely new light on the
sharing economy by highlighting heretofore unappreciated welfare
psychology to more accurately value property in eminent domain proceedings. See Maria M.
Maciá, Comment, Pinning Down Subjective Valuations: A Well-Being-Analysis Approach to
Eminent Domain, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 949 (2016) (arguing that a well-being analysis could
provide courts with an estimate of the hedonic costs of the owner’s displacement, which could
be added to the fair market value of the taken property to more accurately calculate just
compensation).
346. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 144 (“It’s easier for people to seek out exper-
iences, from picnics in the park to nights on the town, when the local environment provides
appropriate settings.”). 
347. See SOMERVILLE, MA: A REPORT ON WELLBEING 4 (2011), http://www.archive.somer
villema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Somerville_Well_Being_Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/G9FZ-GHU9] (finding that the two major publicly funded features that contributed most
to residents’ happiness were the “beauty and maintenance of parks” as well as the “beauty
and physical setting of [the city]”); see also supra note 253.
348. E.O. Wilson coined the idea of “biophilia” as a way to embody the psychological im-
portance of nature to human well-being. See generally EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA (1984)
(defining “biophilia” as “the innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes”). This
notion has been influential in urban design. Google, for example, is currently experimenting
with biophilic design as a way to improve employee retention and performance. See Sharon
Begley, Do We Really Need Nature?, MINDFUL (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.mindful.org/do-we-
really-need-nature/ [https://perma.cc/9A43-JNH7].
349. For a great overview of the sharing economy and its property implications, see
generally Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501 (2016).
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effects. The very act of sharing, for example, may increase subjective
well-being to the extent that it encourages social interaction350 and
allows people to engage in altruism—one of the human activities
most highly correlated with happiness.351
CONCLUSION: ACQUISITION AND OPTIMISM
It may seem that this Article should have been called “Buying
Unhappiness.” A reader could be forgiven for regarding this Article’s
discussion of acquisition and subjective well-being as a pessimistic
one. Part I showed that the overwhelming consensus of studies
agrees that getting more property does not make owners any hap-
pier. Part II followed up by showing how these findings destabilized
empirical assumptions underlying major property theories, ques-
tioning the causal relationship between ownership and wealth max-
imization, autonomy, personhood, and community. And Part III
parlayed these theoretical points into ideas about how to think
differently about property law, proposing reforms such as the full-
court press in favor of homeownership.
For several reasons, though, I want to conclude by showing that
this Article actually reveals an optimistic story about property’s
effect on subjective well-being. First, this Article is not an undiffer-
entiated critique of acquisition; rather, it provides a roadmap for
how and why acquisition can reduce subjective well-being in order
that law may avoid those pitfalls. The consensus of studies shows
that property tends to reduce subjective well-being primarily when
owners expect the fact of acquisition in and of itself to generate
happiness. This false expectation is understandable given the gen-
eral climate of American hyperconsumerism, and in particular the
350. Creating human bonds and cross-cultural conversations is one of the leading selling
points for users of the popular sharing site CouchSurfing.com. See About Us, COUCH SURFING,
http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/5LU7-73SB] (“Give back and
open your home to travelers. Learn about a new culture first-hand or practice a language.
Make the world a little smaller; a little friendlier.”).
351. See DUNN & NORTON, supra note 10, at 108-14 (summarizing studies showing strong
positive relationship between charitable giving and individual happiness). See generally Lara
B. Aknin et al., Does Social Connection Turn Good Deeds into Good Feelings?: On the Value
of Putting the “Social” in Prosocial Spending, 1 INT’L J. HAPPINESS & DEV. 155 (2013)
(reporting results of a study showing that altruism increases happiness, especially when it
results in face-to-face giving).
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U.S. government’s long history of home boosterism. But this means
only that acquisition does not automatically generate happiness, not
that it cannot facilitate happiness in other ways. Property may pro-
vide a means to happiness when it furthers the kinds of memorable
experiences or social connections that have been shown to enhance
subjective well-being. This Article’s suggestion is thus not that we
should simply discourage acquisition wholesale, but that we should
encourage those who do purchase property to do so with the kind of
aims that will more likely foster a happier outcome. To frame home
purchases as a means to quick and easy riches risks materialism,
status competition, and a quick return to the hedonic treadmill. By
contrast, encouraging people to purchase homes in order to facilitate
their favorite activities and experiences or to create a space for
socializing with friends and family may well cause people to buy
happier property.
Second, this Article provides an empirical foundation for de-
linking the idea of being American with the fact of material pos-
session. The constant rhetorical equation of homeownership with
the “American dream” is just the most familiar and explicit equation
of informal citizenship with acquiring property. But this equation
of possession and national belonging comes with downsides that are
revealed in the studies showing that buying a home—or other
property—is not especially likely to increase one’s happiness. Worse,
the ever-present idealization of acquisition may compel people to
make purchases that mire them in debt and leave them less free to
relocate or enjoy the kinds of experiences that do tend to enhance
subjective well-being. Moreover, the equation of high-end property
acquisition with complete citizenship invariably marginalizes the
nontrivial portion of the population which cannot, or chooses not to,
buy a home. Acknowledging the ambivalent effects of acquisition on
happiness may force abandonment of property as the determining
criterion for achieving the “American dream.” In so doing, though,
it may open the door to a richer discussion about what national
identity means, looking not to things and status, but instead to
values that are available to all people and operate independently of
wealth.
This Article thus comes not to bury property, but to praise it—by
properly understanding acquisition as a possible means to, not a
necessary source of, subjective well-being. This finding flows from
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the numerous studies cited in Part I. While they evidence a con-
flicted relationship between getting things and getting happier, they
do not show that acquisition is necessarily poisonous to subjective
well-being. Rather, they caution that ownership—especially of
luxury goods and houses—does not automatically make us feel
better off, while acknowledging property’s capacity to facilitate the
kinds of things—namely experiences and relationships—that do
make us happier. While rooted in recent findings, this insight is one
that philosophers have long invoked in their treatments of property.
Aquinas, for example, regarded property as an institution designed
to serve the common good and make owners more virtuous, rather
than simply a vehicle for accumulating wealth.352 And Eastern
thinkers often regarded the accumulation of material goods and
wealth as a threat to individuals’ well-being. The notion that acqui-
sition is an end in itself is thus a more recent, and perhaps distinc-
tively American (or at least Western), phenomenon attributable to
the rise of neoclassical economics and the enormous rate of global
growth in the last half-century. Hedonics thus provides empirical
support for a point that the ancients have long emphasized: we
would do well to regard property as an institution that can help us
serve other values, not as a value that we should serve above all
things.
352. See 2 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1967-69, 1973-74 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947) (1485).
